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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

TUNISIAN LEADERS CRITICIZE COLONEL QADHDHAFI

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Feb 80 pp 52,55

[Article by Albert Zarca]

[Text] The Tunisian town of Gafsa was invaded by commandos from Libya, the French Embassy in Tripoli was burned by the "mob," our consulate in Benghazi was ransacked, causing the recall of French diplomatic personnel and the expulsion by Paris of an equal number of Libyan diplomats. It seems that, in the past few weeks, the Libyan Government is intensifying its subversive activities. "Qadhafi is totally insane," stated Habib Bourguiba, the president of Tunisia, to FIGARO MAGAZINE. According to Hedi Nouira, the Tunisian prime minister, Qadhafi is a "scatterbrained individual." "He is a dangerous person," added Mohamed Sayah, the leader of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party.]

On 22 December 1979, Colonel Qadhafi granted an interview to FIGARO MAGAZINE. His remarks were those of a responsible head of state, not those of an extremist.

However, recent events call into question the thesis of a "moderate" Qadhafi. Everything proves that Libya is an agent of the USSR in this part of the world, and everywhere else where there is a possibility of destabilization.

Gafsa, 2230 local time. It was a particularly dark evening. No one was on the road. I left Tunis 4 hours earlier and had to stop several times during the 350 kilometer trip from the Tunisian capital to Gafsa. There were identity checks, sometimes car searches, made with a smile and a friendly gesture when my French passport was shown.

I was only 5 kilometers from Gafsa when a spotlight suddenly lit up the car. An order rang out: "Stop!" I hardly had time to put on the brakes. Before me, several Tunisian army soldiers in combat uniform blocked the way, machinegun in hand.

"Turn off your lights and shut off the engine!" The officer who gave

me this order aimed a flashlight at my face and then on the interior of the car. "Documents! Don't you know what a curfew is? You are not allowed out from 2100 to 0500." I explained: "I left Tunis later than expected and was delayed by the roadblocks. Moreover, I was told at Chebila that the curfew had been lifted." "They don't know anything at Chebila. The army did not give you this information. Here, you are dealing with the army."

The atmosphere suddenly became less tense. The officer saw from my passport that I was French and a journalist. "I prefer that," he commented. "Your Transall and Puma planes are nearby. Thanks for lending them to us. Unfortunately, you can not get out of the car. My men will shoot instantly if you do not have the password."

The Tunisian soldiers did not look like amateurs to me--disciplined, professional and clearly determined to tolerate no resistance, even if they had to fight.

Escorted by two police cars, I entered Gafsa. No one was in the streets. Automatic machineguns were in place at the intersections. Patrols scour the streets. I noticed walls marked by bullet holes, a wrecked Algerian bus, and damaged cars: the results of the clashes between the Libyan commandos and the Tunisian army which reduced them to nothing.

Why was Gafsa chosen to try to destabilize the Tunisian Government? Mohamed Sayah, the PSD leader, explained to me several hours earlier before my departure from Tunis:

"Certainly, Tunisia is experiencing social problems and must deal with the economic crisis. But what country does not face the same problems? Qadhafi thought that Bourguiba's government was tottering and that the moment had come to shake it and perhaps make it fall. The result was completely the opposite.

However, we should not believe that Qadhafi will allow himself to be beaten by one failure. This is not the first blow we dealt him and he did not give up then. In my opinion, there will be other operations. Qadhafi's goal is to destabilize Tunisia in order to swallow it. Despite his repeated failures, he continues because he tells himself that the Tunisians will ultimately be discouraged, the tourists will be afraid and the foreign businessmen will give up and no longer invest in Tunisia.

Qadhafi is not acting only on his own account. He wishes to destabilize the Mediterranean. That is much more dangerous for world security. We told the Soviets that we wanted to maintain good trade and cultural relations between the two nations, but that in our opinion, Qadhafi represented a danger because of his opportunist policy. I think they understood our meaning. In any case, I hope so, because Tunisia is not

going to spend its time being attacked without reacting...."

I discovered the same determination in Habib Bourguiba's remarks. His step is still very quick at 76 and although his hair is completely white, he carries his head the same way: proud and determined with a quick sense of humor. In the extreme south of Tunisia, in the shadow of the Nefta palm grove, where he takes his daily walk during his vacation, Habib Bourguiba, president of the Tunisian Republic told me:

"The night of the attack, I slept soundly. In the morning, when informed of the night's events, I was told: 'Perhaps you should return to Tunis. That would be wise.' I answered: 'You are crazy. Return because Qadhafi sent several dozen fanatics to try to spread disorder at Gafsa. No way. I will not budge. Moreover, they will not get very far because I know the qualities of the Tunisian army. It is a peaceful army, but it does not like to be attacked. When that happens, it is capable of reacting very effectively.' The inhabitants of this region are mountain people, strong in their convictions as well as in their physical resistance.

I remained and I was right. Qadhafi is insane. He is insane, completely insane, and moreover dangerous. He believes that with his dollars and petroleum, he can buy the entire world, consciences and lanis. Wherever there is disorder to sow, one finds evidence of his presence--in the Philippines, Northern Ireland and even Corsica. What is he going to do in Corsica?

or Qadhafi, 'the people have only to submit and be silent. Evolution must be achieved by bombs. Neighbors, brothers? They must submit like the others! He does not understand Tunisia, and he certainly does not understand me.'

One evening in December 1972, the 16th to be exact, Qadhafi came to Tunisia. He made a speech to the Palmarium and, slightly indisposed, I was not there that evening. However, I was listening to his speech on the radio, broadcast live. Suddenly, I jumped up. Qadhafi, on Tunisian territory, was encouraging the Tunisians to revolt, spoke of a merger, etc. I jumped into my car and, although sick, I went to answer him on the rostrum. I tried to explain to him that a nation is something one builds. An artificial merger between Tunisia and Libya can not be created. The Libyans were colonialized by Italy, and we, by France. We have acquired different concepts of life. He did not wish to listen.

Since then, Qadhafi has thrown himself into subversion, terrorism. This can not be tolerated. The Tunisians are not obeying. When I had disputes with France, we were candid. When we reached an understanding, it was done without ulterior motives on either side. This is impossible with Mr Qadhafi. Then I decided to get rid of everything: his embassy, his cultural centers, true nests of spies, and anything which could cause disorder in our country.

Some 22 years after the beginning of the colonial era, France showed herself worthy of her image in the world. In the Gafsa affair, she felt that Tunisia and the western Mediterranean were in danger. She did not hesitate. She came to Tunisia's aid even before it was requested. She sent her warships to the Gulf of Gabes. This was not intervention. It was only a contribution to maintaining peace.

We must be on guard: destabilizing Tunisia means destabilizing the western Mediterranean and the entire region, with incalculable consequences for the western world. I say it without exaggerating: 'Be alert. Expansionism is on the rise. The world is in danger of sliding into the abyss.' France understood our concern; this made me happy and it touched me. How can I respond? Thank you, the French did not surprise me. They reacted like great men, as we are used to seeing them act...."

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP CHANGES--AL-SIYASAH has learned that structural changes are slated to occur in the composition of the PLO Executive Committee during the convening of the 15th Session of the Palestinian National Council in coming weeks. Heading the list of probable changes is the creation of the position of vice president of the PLO Executive Committee. Changes are also expected in the existing portfolios of the Executive Committee, since it has been proposed that the individual responsible for the Political Office be changed with the aim of keeping abreast of coming regional and international developments. Meanwhile, AL-SIYASAH has learned that there is a move in the FATAH movement to create the position of secretary general of the movement. This position would be entrusted to Yasir 'Arafat, the supreme commander of the Palestinian revolution. [Text] [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 17 Jan 80 p 1] 8591

YAR TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA, PDRY--Riyadh, 5 Mar--YAR Consultative Council member Shaykh 'Abdallah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar has warned against Soviet infiltration around the Arabian Peninsula. In an interview with the Saudi paper AL-MADINAH today, Shaykh al-Ahmar called on Moslems to be alert and cautious, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On the situation between the two parts of Yemen, Shaykh al-Ahmar said that the people in North and South Yemen are one people and that the South is an indivisible part of the North. He expressed hope that unity between the two parts of Yemen will be established under a constitution inspired by Islamic law and spirit. On his country's relations with Saudi Arabia, Shaykh al-Ahmar stressed that they are relations of brotherhood between one people having the same creed and linked by ties of Arab brotherhood. Shaykh al-Ahmar denounced the campaigns that try to cast doubts on relations between the two countries. [Text] [JN051005 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0945 GMT 80 JN]

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AFGHANISTAN

BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL EVENTS, SOVIET INTERVENTION REVIEWED

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Feb 80 pp 6-7

[Article by Alexandre Dastarac and M. Levent: "Afghan Nationalities Aroused"]

[Text] With the turbulence created by the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, geopolitical considerations tend to blur the internal reality of the country. Yet this reality is at the very heart of the difficulties encountered by the superpowers.

The significance and implications of the presence of Soviet troops in Kabul become clear only through correct analysis of the actual part played by the different factions--the Parcham and the Khalq--within the PDPA (Afghan People's Democratic Party) since April 1978. The current president's personality alone illustrates the extent of the impasse his two ill-fated predecessors had reached. The "tiger at work"--translation of Babrak Karmal's name--has absolutely no chance of disarming the rebel movements who view him, more than any other, as the direct spokesman of the USSR. He will be equally unable to mobilize the support of the remaining diehard PDPA militants who have physically or morally survived successive purges. This son of a Royal Army general, Mohammad Hussain, had maintained such ambiguous relations with the political elite of the former regime that his party, the Parcham, was derisively labeled communist-monarchist by members of the Khalq.

Apart from his natural oratorical ability, Babrak Karmal has none of the qualities that are valued highly in Afghan leftist circles. Of Pashtun (or Pathan) origin--the Kakar tribe--but divorced from the culture of his ethnic group--most of his speeches were in Dari⁽¹⁾--he cannot, unlike Nur Mohammad Taraki, profess to have any thorough familiarity with the common people. Nor can he get people to believe or trust him when he depicts himself as the political heir of a man his movement had loudly accused of being a CIA agent. The Parcham is the weakest party, the one least rooted in Afghan society. How then can its return to power be explained? How has this regime, supported by the Soviet Army, now been reduced to being narrowly-based on merely a handful of individuals?

The PDPA's seizure of power had caught both Iran and the USSR unawares.(2) Although it was a very minority faction and had assumed power through a coup d'etat, the Khalq, supreme in a government composed of nationalist and Parcham elements, initially held some real trump cards. At that time, Kabul was the scene of the greatest celebrations in its history: the joy which the city's residents felt over the end of the former regime was matched by the wait-and-see attitude and benevolent neutrality of the different regions of the country. Afghanistan, "Kalat-al-Islam," that reputedly impregnable eastern bastion of Sunni Islam, was very far from responding to appeals for militant action against the new regime being issued by spokesmen of the "Moslem rebels" who had taken refuge in Pakistan at the time.

The Khalq has but a few thousand members. While it does have an unquestionably larger social base than its rival, the Parcham which is confined to the urban intellectual elite, it has, nevertheless, drawn the bulk of its forces from among the educated youth. The Khalq leadership had adopted a democratic program which scarcely went beyond reforms promised by the Daoud government (1973-1978). Incidentally, the latter had once been accused of having copied its first program from the Khalq's program. The "democratic national" phase initiated by the PDPA made changes in only two but, nevertheless, fundamental matters:

1. Recognition of the ethnic minorities and their rights of expression. But their political representation did not survive the short-lived first government which, for the first time in Afghanistan, had associated Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara elements with the government.

2. Solidarity with the Pashtun and Baluchi peoples and recognition of their right to autonomy in the struggle for liberation.

These two original features were weakened considerably in actual practice: the Pashtuns retained their majority in the government, and the policy followed jointly with Pakistan appreciably qualified the self-determination of the Pashtun and Baluchi peoples.

The democratic national program brought together the working class, peasants, intelligentsia, small craftsmen, and lower middle class under the leadership of the PDPA(3) in the antifeudal phase. But a contradiction very quickly emerged between this program and the repression within both the armed forces and the administration. This repression did not limit itself to monarchistic and pro-Iranian elements. It also extended to liberals in the officer corps. The foreseeable ouster of the Parcham, 3 months after the April revolution, could be partly interpreted as a mark of independence from the USSR. The ouster was followed by elimination of the nationalities, thereby depriving the governmental apparatus of essential allies. Therein lies a fundamental weakness: on the one hand, the government promises to abolish "feudal relationships," while on the other hand, it victimizes members of the intelligentsia and lower middle class. In September 1978,

this contradiction became more pronounced and thus lowered the Khalq's credibility throughout the country. The way many party cadres interpreted "feudal relationships" in rural areas did not offset mistakes detrimental to the urban population. Worse, it even exacerbated these mistakes.

Young Khalq cadres have an ideology that is more "modernist" than Marxist-Leninist, an ideology whose origins lie primarily in a highly heterogeneous educational system. Only the children of the elite had access to the few secondary schools administered by different countries--like France and Germany--and had the possibility of attending institutions of higher learning abroad. Whereas sons of lower middle class families and a very few rural families attended the state-run Khushal Khan Khattak secondary school before having access to the few university faculties affiliated, for the most part, with European countries and the United States (only the Polytechnical Institute was financed by the USSR). Students received government scholarships and thus rapidly became independent of their families. Most of the Khalq's cadre's were recruited in the Khushal Khan Khattak secondary school. This educational system precluded the education and training of a homogeneous corp with deep roots in the Afghan society. On the contrary, most students considered that their own society was backward and needed instruction and close supervision. Marxists believe the party should be responsible for the accelerated modernization of rural areas, while nationalists believe the state should have that responsibility.

One can imagine, therefore, what reactions were produced by this elite's arrival in rural areas, an elite divided and stratified by its very education and training.

There have been countless reports of such reactions and incidents since the winter of 1978. For example, cadres arrive in a village and summon all of the people--men, women, and children--to attend reading and writing classes. The next day, the great majority of the villagers fail to appear for the first class, because they object to having women appear at a public gathering. The cadres view this as a backward, reactionary attitude and employ various forms of persuasion, indeed even physical force, to assemble the villagers, women included. At best, the cadres are expelled from the village. Occasionally, however, their bodies are later found on the outskirts of the village. During a visit we made to Afghanistan in 1972, the Daoud government deemed it prudent to have us escorted into the Paktia region by some 30 soldiers who were visibly uneasy and nervous in a region where they were barely tolerated.

Agrarian Reform, "Worker State"

This was how the first resistance cells were formed in the Paktia, Kunar, and Nuristan regions. Repressive measures merely caused these centers of rebellion to expand. As a result, the Khalq decided to step up the agrarian reform program in hopes of rallying the majority of the peasants.

President Taraki had announced it would take 3 years to complete preliminary agrarian reform studies. Only Decree No 6, of 12 July 1978, on usury and the cancellation of a large part of all debts, was to be implemented immediately in order to give peasant farmers some relief. But because of the different systems of land tenure and their associated social structures, it was impossible to apply a uniform pattern of reform.(4)

This accelerated agrarian reform begun in November 1978 can be connected with a speech by H. Amin in which he identified the April revolution as being "the prolongation of the great October Revolution of 1917." His statement was quickly echoed by Moscow: "Since the victory of the April 1978 revolution, the Afghan people, under the PDPA's leadership, have begun the task of building socialism."(5) But in a country whose population is 87 percent rural, the Khalq, blinded by a dogmatic refusal to reckon with the strength of tribal structures, proved incapable of isolating the landowners. By putting them in the same category as big feudal landowners, according to definitions given Third World students at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, the Khalq was unable to grasp the distinction between, for example, the social role of a tribal chief and the role of a landowner. This lack of understanding was to have its inevitable tragic consequences.

This policy could only rally clans and branches to the side of their tribal chiefs and eventually incite entire tribes to rebel against the central government. It should be noted that Taraki and Amin used their tribal influence in a traditional framework. Belonging to the Ghilzai confederation of the Pashtuns, they were able to secure the neutrality of certain regions (Kabul-Kandahar) for a long time by stressing the point that for the first time, the Duranis, a branch of the former ruling family, no longer controlled the government. The dispatching of troops into the villages of the "feudal landowners" was followed in April-May 1979 by bombing raids. At the same time, families in Kabul were being arrested on suspicion because of their ties with tribes against whom repressive measures were being taken. In August 1979, the PDPA announced that 822,500 acres had been redistributed to 132,000 families,(6) some of which were immediately grouped into cooperatives. But in certain regions where these reforms stirred no open revolt, they were, nevertheless, a failure. By severing the old ties between peasants and landowners, the reforms deprived peasants of access to water, seed, draft animals or machinery without offering them any real compensation.

Simultaneously, the PDPA's regional autonomy declined and its internal weaknesses worsened more rapidly. The PDPA was bloated with officials, cringing because frightened, or with ambitious students who were being promised all sort of favors. Consequently it scarcely resembled the PDPA of April 1978.

the militants who had been trained by the Khalq--many were killed in the initial fighting--were now submerged within the mass of new members controlled by Hafizullah Amin.

The events at Herat, in March 1979, where the garrison rebelled against Soviet orders to quell a demonstration, were followed by a decisive turning point in Hafizullah Amin's rise to power: he was named prime minister and assumed control of the AQSA⁽⁷⁾ [Service for the Protection of Afghanistan's Interests], a veritable secret police. Faced with a worsening situation marked by the first serious revolts in the armed forces, the government created, on 2 April 1979, a national defense council with Taraki as its chairman.⁽⁸⁾ On 6 April, a Soviet delegation arrived in Kabul. It was led by A. A. Epichev, head of the armed forces general policy directorate and a member of the Central Committee. At the end of this visit, Vasiliiy Sazonov, the official responsible for coordination between the USSR and Afghanistan, moved his office into the People's House (Government House) near Taraki's office. At that time, it was estimated that there were 5,000 Soviet advisers assigned throughout the administration and another 5,000 in the armed forces.

Fearing additional defections in the armed forces, the national defense council confined officers and men to their barracks and bases and had the rebel areas systematically bombed and strafed. Not only villages became air force targets, but also crops, in an effort to starve the rebels. This policy of all-out air attacks on crops had disastrous consequences. As of late August 1979, the grain shortage amounted to 1.5 million tons, or about 5 times the country's import requirements.⁽⁹⁾ During this period, the exodus of tribes into Pakistan increased, and guerrilla groups, supported at that time by the Pakistani militia, recruited among this refugee population.

On 21 July, following a cabinet shakeup in which Prime Minister Amin also became minister of defense and minister of interior, a major event occurred that was to play a decisive part in the development of Amin's relations with the USSR. The Fort Bala-Tsar garrison was considered to be the most reliable elite unit. Its officers were all Khalq members. The AQSA proceeded to arrest and execute some of these officers. At noon on 5 August, mutiny broke out: the soldiers decided to march to the presidential palace about 1.5 kilometers from the fort. For a moment, the government tottered. Tanks were sent to halt the insurgents who then withdrew into the fort. Aircraft and helicopters were then employed against them. The soldiers resisted late into the night but were killed to a man.

A Mysterious Affair

Because Hafizullah Amin's Soviet-backed policy--in the summer of 1979, the estimated daily cost of keeping the regime alive was 9 million dollars, exclusive of outlays for weapons and ammunitions--had proved to be a failure,

Moscow seemed to be trying to find an alternate solution. Taraki's trip to the conference of nonaligned nations in Havana was to offer the Soviets such an opportunity. Upon his return from Havana, Taraki stopped in Moscow on 10 September, where he had a private meeting with Brezhnev and Babrak Karmal. The decision was made at this meeting to reunify the PDPA, return to the democratic national program, and release the political prisoners. These measures would, at the very least, appreciably reduce Amin's powers.

A few days after Taraki's return to Kabul, the world learned of his resignation and then of his death. The circumstances surrounding his elimination are still not very clear. The following version of what happened must be taken with a grain of salt. It does have the merit, however, of giving coherence to the "suspense novel" aspect and the "political" aspect of this affair. This version comes from a secret report submitted to the Khalq leadership in the first week of October.

By the end of August 1979, an atmosphere of tension and "spy mania" had spread throughout the PDPA. Hafizullah Amin had learned from "reliable comrades"--Aziz, a nephew of Assadullah Sarwari, chairman of the AQSA's internal section, and Nawab, vice chairman of the same agency--that "Taraki and his gang," namely Assadullah Sarwari, Said Mohamad Ghulab Zoi, Sher Ali Mardaryar, and Aslam Watanjar, had plotted to assassinate him during Taraki's trip to Havana. "Taraki's plane was scheduled to arrive in Kabul at about 1500 Tuesday 11 September. Nawab informed Amin at 1400 that the final arrangements had been completed for the Taraki gang's plan"--to execute Amin--"and that this plan would be implemented." The plan was fulfilled, and "when Taraki came out of the plane and saw Amin, he was extremely surprised and nearly lost his balance." Amin is said to have been asked Taraki for assurances, including the ouster of "the men of his gang from the government." Taraki is reported to have strenuously refused. Then there was a great deal of bargaining in an effort to arrange a meeting between the two men. Actually Amin was being kept regularly informed of all the traps set for him and he refused to go to Taraki's office or home unless accompanied by his own armed guards. Then came the report that Taraki's gang had appeared...at the Soviet Embassy requesting political asylum." Finally, Taraki and Amin were having a stormy meeting in the former's office in the presence of their armed bodyguards "when the news arrived that the Soviet ambassador wanted to see the two men together. The ambassador and his three senior advisers"--their names are not mentioned in the report--"then arrived with a verbal message from Brezhnev saying that unity among the Afghan leaders is advantageous to the Afghan revolution." After a brief period of calm, the acrimonious dispute resumed once the Soviets had left.

On 16 September, Amin refused to go to Taraki's office where the latter had ordered him "to report immediately, unarmed and without guards." Amin replied: "Nobody goes to his death of his own free will." Major Taroon, Taraki's aide-de-camp, but Amin's agent, and Colonel Yakub, the chief of staff, warned Amin not to go "to the People's House under any circumstances."

The situation was coming to a head when "Taraki called Amin and told him the Soviet comrades wanted him to come to the People's House to discuss matters." Amin replied that "he would be there right away, but with his guards." After having refused this condition, Taraki decided to accept it. Then the Soviet ambassador told Amin: "Taraki assures me you will not be fired upon, so come." Upon the advice of Taroon who felt that "since the Soviet ambassador and the other Soviet comrades are there, they will not dare to be so impudent as to shoot," Amin arrived at the People's House with his bodyguards. As he was going up the stairs, Taraki's guards opened fire. Taroon fell to the ground, dead. Amin "leaped to the bottom of the stairs, fled...and went to the Ministry of Defense." From there, he organized the attack on the presidential palace where Taraki was killed. Amin was elected president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister on 16 September.

Regardless of any reservations one might possibly have about this obviously biased document, its main points have now been confirmed. It reveals how relations between Amin and the USSR changed. The Afghan Government having asked the USSR, on 6 October 1979, to recall Puzanov, its ambassador to Afghanistan since 1970 and a member of the Central Committee, Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Shah Jali criticized the Soviet ambassador in a meeting with 11 representatives of socialist countries. The Khalq's document has much more to say about Puzanov. Upon reading it, party cadres could no longer harbor any illusions about the way Soviet agencies were directly involved in manipulating the Afghan party's operations. Furthermore, Amin could no longer have any doubts about the way these same agencies opposed him.

Khalq members were, for the most part, as concerned about national independence as the Afghan man in the street. Their pledge of friendship and admiration given to the USSR was a sign more of an elating solidarity than of their dependence. For months, however, behind a facade of unity, there had been mounting bottled-up anger within the administration and the armed forces at the arrogance of Soviet advisers who did not hesitate to give orders to the country's highest officials.

To heal the wounds of a nation that had been bled white, Amin decided to try the impossible. He knew that he had limited room in which to maneuver, that the tribal society was not very inclined to forgive and forget the mass corpses, and that the Soviets were waiting for him to make his first false step. He timidly took a few appeasing measures. Abdul Qader, "the hero of the 28th of July," had his death sentence commuted to 15 years in prison. Other architects of the April revolution were also pardoned. Radio Kabul announced the release of hundreds of prisoners, but new arrests were soon to fill the prisons.(10) Amin adopted the major points of the program Taraki was supposed to unveil upon his return from Cuba. The recommended measures included maintenance of small private property, incentives for national capitalists, and the protection of religion.

the Khalq's Central Committee overwhelmingly rallied to Amin's side. While the new president took umbrage at the USSR, for the moment, he could hope to survive only by crushing the widespread rebellion. But the disintegration of the armed forces was such that he could not do without Soviet military support. Its agreement intensified when Amin resisted having the armed forces restructured under the direction of Soviet advisers, despite the visit of Semenovich Paputin, vice director of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. The latter mysteriously disappeared at the end of December 1979 when the Soviets began landing a massive number of troops in Afghan soil.

End of Pashtun Dynasty

By the summer of 1979, the policy relative to the different ethnic groups, a policy that was an important part of the PDPA's program in its early days, patently appeared to be collapsing. Keenly desirous of consolidating the new Afghan state, the Khalq could not dodge this fundamental question. Thus the radio programs broadcast in the languages of the different ethnic groups were a positive initiative. Yet this approach was, nevertheless, altogether too superficial, inasmuch as it consisted of the same program simply translated into Uzbek, Baluchi, Nuristani, etc., after being reviewed and revised by the censorship of Soviet advisers. Much more fraught with consequence was the application of reforms that, in practice, did not take into account the socioeconomic realities peculiar to the different ethnic groups. The image of a ground swell for the defense of Islam against the communist peril is a very inaccurate depiction of what really happened: the revolts originated spontaneously and differed in both tempo and form. No political or religious force can lay claim to controlling any of the populations in open rebellion.

To understand the opposition forces that continued to expand throughout different forces as the Moslem rebels operating among the Pashtun people in the Paktia, Kunar, Nuristan, and Badakhshan regions--two essential characteristics must be considered: first, the qualitative differences of these opposition forces, differences stemming from the ethnic groups in which they are deeply rooted; secondly, their lack of political unity.

The Pashtuns play a main role because of their numerical importance--approximately 7 million persons, or 40 percent of the population--and their political influence in Afghanistan and likewise in Pakistan (1 million). Ever since the partition of India, the Afghan state has always exploited the Pashtun irredentist movement in Pakistan. This exploitation was politically expressed in such elitist organizations as the Afghan Millet, an extreme rightist, chauvinistic movement whose political program consisted mainly in calling for restoration of the "real Afghanistan." This organization maintained political ties on the other side of the Mortimer Durand Line with the Khudai Khitmadgar (servants of God) led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. His son, Wali Khan,

represented a leftist movement (that accepted Soviet support) with which the Parcham in Afghanistan can be associated. The common point of these four groups is that they have been linked to the Afghan dynasties at one time or another.

After the hanging of Ali Bhutto, the former Pakistani president, the USSR felt the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) would win the elections--promised by General Zia-ul-Haq in November 1979--in the provinces of Sind and Punjab. Thus while the USSR opted, in April 1979, for a "hard line" toward the rebels in Afghanistan, it followed a flexible policy with regard to the political forces trying to neutralize the government in Pakistan. The military offensive planned for the winter of 1979 and the accession to power of a radicalized PPP would have caught the Afghan rebels in a pincer movement. With this prospect in mind, the Kremlin exerted pressure on the Kabul regime to have it use its influence on the Baluchis and Pashtuns in Pakistan to get them to form an electoral alliance with the PPP. But the Khalq refused to deal with Wali Khan, leader of the Democratic National Party (PND), because it considered him to be opportunistic and close to the Parcham. The Khalq did agree to work with the Baluchi autonomist parliamentary wing, headed by Ghons Bux Bizenjo and Attaullah Khan Mengal, within the same party. These two men, receiving Soviet moral and financial support through the Khalq, decided to break with Wali Khan's party. They formed the Pakistan National Party and sought to establish an electoral alliance with the PPP. The left wing of the PPP, wrongly considered to be in the majority by the Soviets, sent a secret delegation to Kabul in mid-June 1979. It left Kabul in late July. At the same time, the Khalq, under Soviet pressure, tried in vain to convince the BPLF (Baluchi People's Liberation Front) to support this electoral alliance. The BPLF refused to be convinced, refused to join an electoral alliance or abandon its strategy of armed struggle against the Pakistani state, in favor of elections which, for it in any case, would not be held. The PNP demanded, in return for its participation in an electoral alliance, that the PPP, in the event of victory, amend the 1973 constitution to guarantee provincial autonomy. When the PPP delegation returned from Kabul, that party's left-wing was defeated and became a minority faction: General Tikka Khan became PPP secretary and refused to amend the 1973 constitution. The Soviet plan thus collapsed in two ways, inasmuch as the elections were not held. Here again, the Kremlin weakened the Khalq's credibility on the Baluchi and Pashtun issue, thereby removing a decisive instrument from the Afghan foreign policy's independence.

The April revolution in Afghanistan could not help but worry Pakistan, the "natural refugee center" for the first opponents of the new Afghan regime. Later on, General Zia-ul-Haq, whose stoutest support is from the Islamic right, proved to be quite prepared to finance, train, and arm religious groups desirous of putting an end to the "atheistic regime" in Kabul. The Jamiat Islami Afghan, led by Burhanuddin Rabanni, was thus

ible to receive support from Pakistan, and through the latter, aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Rabbani's group is endeavoring to bring other groups under its wing, such as the Hezbe-i-Islami, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, the National Liberation Front, and different Pashtun tribal factions.

the National Liberation Front of Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani--"a descendant of the Prophet" and an important religious figure in his capacity as leader of the Qatariwa sect--is not connected with any ethnic group in Afghanistan. One of the largest landowners in the Kabul region and an important business man, Gailani has ties with the monarchy through his wife. He represents the interests of the elite who were in power at the time of Zahir Shah. He is a pro-Western, out-and-out monarchist much more than a religious fundamentalist. Just as unrepresentative of the Pashtun people is the movement headed by Sib Ghatollah Mujadedi, the nephew of a great religious figure and member of a rich and powerful family which was at the height of its power under Zahir Shah, but damaged its reputation by contributing to the overthrow of King Amanullah with the help of the British. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's party, the Hezbe-i-Islami, is actually the most important because it can lay claim to a political past. Gulbuddin has lived in exile in Pakistan ever since the Daoud government. He is both an Islamic fundamentalist and a modernist. Resolutely anti-monarchistic, he formed his movement among the urban middle classes. Unlike the aforementioned groups, Gulbuddin's movement appears to be firmly established in Kunar, Nuristan, and even Badakhshan. That is why he very recently refused to join with the pan-Islamic forces.(11)

Resistance Among Oppressed Minorities

The situation is appreciably different in the north and northeast of the country among the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Turkomans. The relatively very few Turkomans are in large part descendants of families living fled from Soviet Turkmenistan after the Basmachi revolts of the 1920's. Hence their hostility to the PDPA and especially to the Soviet military. The Settam-i-Arelir and the Shula-Yi-Jawad, Maoist Marxist-Leninist parties formed some 10 years ago, seem to have the political and organizational capability of rallying the resistance within the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara peoples. These two parties are violently opposed to Pushtun domination as well as to the PDPA which they call revisionist. They receive aid from neighboring China which views these parties as allies against Soviet expansionism. Their combativity has enabled them to gain increased influence within the resistance movement in the Hazara-Tajik region. The Hazaras are Afghanistan's most oppressed ethnic minority. They have never possessed means of political expression, except possibly through the large landowners who formed part of the governmental aristocracy. When creation of the Hazarajat Liberation Front was announced in mid-1979, with Abdul Wahed Sehrabi as its representative, the most general interpretation was that it was a religious movement backed by Iran. The Hazaras are Afghanistan's sole Shiite community and it is certain that Ayatollah Shariatmadari tried to make use of it. Sehrabi, a former

member of Parliament under Zahir Shah and minister in different cabinets from 1967 to 1971, could gain Iran's support. But contradictions quickly surfaced within the Front when Sehrabi accepted appointment by the Khalq as legislative adviser to the Ministry of Justice. Hafizullah Amin depicted this as a major political victory. Yet the rebellion in the Hazarajat region did not cease. On the contrary, its structure was not inebitably more developed than the rebellion in the south of the country.

The Baluchi and Brahuis minority in the southwest of the country is extremely isolated in a semidesert region and has had very little contact with the Afghan Government. The regime's proclaimed support of the Baluchis was initially greeted quite favorably. But the bloody events in Herat, where a good number of the officers were Baluchis, and the PDPA's attempt to coercively implement social reforms triggered an exodus of the principal tribes. Some 90 percent of the Baluchis sought refuge in Iran, not because of any religious or political affinity, but because of tribal ties existing on both sides of the border. The Nahrni, Reki, Sanjrani, and Ghur Gesh tribes are afflicted with tribes in Iranian Baluchistan. Only a group of 300 warriors, under the direction of the Sardar Ghur Gesh, fought against the Khalq. The other tribes decided to consult with the Baluchi tribes in Iran and Pakistan and mark their disapproval by leaving the country. Baluchi resistance does seem to have intensified, however, since the massive influx of Soviet troops. Contrary to reports in the Western press, this resistance is not receiving aid from the Iranian authorities but from the insurgents in Iranian Baluchistan. Furthermore, it maintains no relations with the Islamic rebellion.

The Afghan state's gradual erosion will have radical repercussions on relations between the national minorities and the central government. The resistance in Afghanistan may be divided into three blocs:

- a. The militant opposition by Pashtuns in the south and southeast is expressed mainly through the Islamic right bolstered by Pakistan;
- b. In the north, northeast, and center of the country, China hopes to expand its sphere of influence directly south of the Soviet border by supporting the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara movements; in the west, Iran is trying, for its part, to furnish ambiguous support in the Hazarajat region by playing on the sentiment of the religious community;
- c. Lastly, in the southwest, the Baluchis, deprived of all support and threatened by the three central governments, are subjected to a centripetal movement leading to their unification which could find its expression only in an independent Baluchistan.

The PDPA's political evolution as from September 1979 does, to a certain extent, give some credibility to the Soviet point of view. While the Manichean version which contends that former president Amin was a CIA agent is amusing, the facts do clearly show that, for Amin, after the

events of September, breaking with the USSR some time or other had become a necessity. In the same connection, the PDPA, with its organization reshuffled from top to bottom, stood collectively behind Amin and no longer furnished the USSR any guarantee against some rash move. The report that Hafizullah Amin's brother, Abdullah Amin, has joined the Shula-Yi-Jawed guerrilla movement, if confirmed, will reinforce the credibility of this theory.

Why are Soviet troops in Kabul? The answer largely transcends Afghanistan's internal problems. The incoherence of the policy pursued by the Kremlin since April 1978 opens up a new field for conjecture. In the USSR, supporters of interventionism, paralyzing the "Brezhnev line," pressured the Soviet Union to evade the issue by taking the offensive. Some persons in the Kremlin will undoubtedly long regret the period when "Prince Daoud's republic" followed a policy of "positive" alignment.

World Peace

Back then, the CPSU abetted the Parcham very little, and the Khalq even less. At the very most, the Parcham was used as a means of exerting pressure to balance the Daoud government. Daoud fell at the very time the last stone was about to be laid in building the famous "strategic arch." Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were scheduled to be joined soon by Afghanistan. Parcham members, reformist nationalists, had been eliminated from the government which was under the growing influence of pro-Iranian elements, because at that time the SAVAK maneuvered freely in Kabul.

Had luck favored Moscow, the easily controllable Parcham would have assumed power. Then it would have been possible to put up a moderate international facade, initiate limited reforms, and ensure Afghanistan's tight economic and political dependence on the USSR. But bad luck brought with it the Khalq, a party "more Octobrist than October," with certain influence in Afghan society and willing to use it to carry out essential reforms promised by Daoud but never completed. The Kremlin "doves" protected the Parcham and were temporarily compelled to pin all their hopes on Taraki who was supposed to implement the democratic national revolution's program. But Nur Mohammad Taraki was a talented writer and secondarily an ideologist more than an organization man. The party man was Hafizullah Amin. It was he who played a decisive part in the organization and success of the April 1978 coup, while Taraki, helpless, powerless in prison, the intensified repressive action being taken against the Afghan left. Amin was the man well-known for his intransigence, that those persons whom must be called the "hawks" (for want of a better term) in the Kremlin selected to coordinate a dynamic offensive compelling the "doves" to adopt a wait-and-see policy. The solution devised in an effort to retrieve a disastrous situation consisted in installing a two-headed Taraki-Babruk government. But this plan--apparently poorly conceived for reasons still to be clarified--having failed, political considerations gave way to a military dynamic and the "hawks" achieved their aims.

It is easy today to attempt to revive myths and recall Peter the Great's predictions which definitely obsess Chinese leaders and some Western officials. Is the political disaster suffered by the USSR in the space of a few weeks worth the advantage the USSR would gain from a highly hypothetical access to warm-water ports? Hence only the hypothesis, now at least partly supported, of dissension within the Kremlin can account for the colossal "mistake" made by the USSR in choosing to intervene militarily. The logical conclusion of the "Brezhnev doctrine" of "limited sovereignty" was to transform Afghanistan permanently into a defensive glacis. In theory, the Afghan Government's actual dependence should have saved the USSR the trouble of direct intervention to achieve this transformation. Contrariwise, the plan of the "hawks" is to transform this new strategic acquisition into bargaining chips before Westerners take the region completely in hand again.

Can there be another Yalta without first having a war? Though speculations about the dangers of war are useless, we can, nevertheless, state that the danger lies in the fact that a "buffer zone" has disappeared, and this regardless of the Afghan rebellion's fate.

Washington's response--reinforcement of American bases in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Pakistan considered as possible areas of intervention, and the introduction of a new partner, China whose demands are still limited--carries the game of power plays to the maximum-risk level. The Afghan card played by the USSR is fraught with many difficulties. On the internal level, we cannot see how Babrak Karmal's government--composed of a shaky coalition of technocrats and pro-Taraki Khalq members assembled under the Parcham's wing--can regain any broad-based popular support. At best, can this new government hope to manage the occupation of the cities? On the external level, the Soviet occupation has prompted the first steps toward normalization: in Iran, after Bani-Sadr's latest statements; in Pakistan, where General Zia-ul-Haq finds an unexpected way out of the impasse he was in. Lastly, the dispatching of an expeditionary corps, 40 percent of which is Tajik, 25 percent Uzbek, and 25 percent Turkman, is linked to conventional counterinsurgency considerations as well as to the desire to lessen the possible impact in European Russia of the engagement of Soviet troops with foreseeable very heavy losses. If the honor of "dying for Afghanistan" is not given to the sons of White Russia--10 percent of the troops assigned to Afghanistan, mainly officers--isn't this plan likely to prove dangerous for the future? Demoralization, indeed even contamination of the troops from Soviet Central Asia cannot be ruled out.

No matter what the ultimate consequences of this intervention may be, they cannot help but foster the emergence of a counterlogic: the logic of the region's peoples is gradually becoming opposed to the logic of their governments. By deliberately refusing to consider this region of Asia as not being a chessboard, the superpowers, yielding more and more to the

working of the "madman's theory" so dear to Henry Kissinger, are making mankind run a great risk. Far from having opened their eyes, the Iranian experience is currently prompting them to follow a course of action that can only produce a succession of genocides: at a time when the peoples of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are simultaneously questioning the validity of their Parsi-, Pashtun-, and Punjabi-dominated governments, the superpowers are determined to obtain regional stabilization, no matter what the cost may be.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dari: the official language along with Pashto (form of archaic Persian).
2. Cf. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, January 1979.
3. Cf. Nur Mohammad Taraki's press conference, 6 May 1978.
4. Cultivable regions are concentrated in the large Northern Plains and in the mountain valleys of northeastern and central Afghanistan. In the south and west, there are cultivable areas along the rivers. Nomadic herdsmen represent 17 percent of the rural population.
5. See MIROVAYA ECONOMIKA, April 1979.
6. See ANTIIMPERIALISTISCHES INFORMATIONS-BULLETIN, Masburg, October 1979.
7. AQSA: Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satalo Edara (Service for the Protection of Afghanistan's Interests).
8. The national defense council had nine members: Nur Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Sher Jan Mazduryar (minister of interior), Asadullah Sarwari (head of the AQSA), Iqbal (chairman of political affairs for the armed forces), Colonel Watanjar (defense minister), Colonel Yakub (chief of staff), Colonel Gholam Sakhi (air defense commander), and Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Mohamed (air force commander).
9. Amin's answer to a senior official reporting this shortage to him: "The Soviet comrades have recommended we follow this policy as a means of depriving the rebels of food. And this tactic is showing results. They have assured us they will make up the deficit." As a result of this report, the rumor of a wheat shortage spread throughout Kabul. The first persons to hear this rumor began buying large quantities and merchants lost no time increasing their stocks for speculative purposes. The government then took severe measures and affirmed that the USSR had already given Afghanistan 700,000 tons of wheat.

10. The new government acknowledged 12,000 persons had been held in the city of Kabul alone. The regime had promised to release all political prisoners. Yet those who have been released to date include members of the Parcham and a few members of the royal family.

11. Announcement has been made of a new attempt to unite the various rebel groups, notably the movements of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ershad, and Rabanni. Gailani's movement is reported to have refused to join this new alliance.

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TUDEH PARTY CHIEF ASSESSES KHOMEYNI REVOLUTION

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 5 Feb 80 pp 62-65

[Interview with Nureddin Kianuri, secretary general of the Tudeh Party, by Jorge Timossi, special PRENSA LATINA correspondent]

[Text] The ideological development of the Iranian revolutionary process, a brief description of its class composition, the country's present situation and the role of the communists in the present transformational stage are some of the subjects dealt with by Nureddin Kianuri, secretary general of the Tudeh Party of Iran, with PRENSA LATINA [PL].

Kianuri received the special correspondent from PL in his office in the Tudeh headquarters, a four-story building at an edge of the University of Tehran where its official organ, the daily MARDOM (People), is also published.

In the interview, the Iranian communist leader told us, among other interesting things, how the situation of the hostages in the occupied United States Embassy could be resolved.

"I think the issue of the hostages will be resolved this way, if the United States remains in its present position, with no changes," he said. "We'll conduct an international proceeding directed against American imperialism. It won't be a personal proceeding against the hostages. Perhaps it will be for two or three who are proven spies, but not for the body of them. It will be a proceeding to show the entire world the true face of American imperialism."

[Question] Could you give us a general characterization of the present political situation in Iran?

[Answer] We can say that we have entered a new phase of Iran's popular, democratic, anti-imperialist revolution. The characteristic of this new phase is the marked intensification of the anti-imperialist, popular thrust of the revolution.

Concerning the first aspect, it is the Ayatollah Khomeyni's line that began stressing this over 2 months ago when he pointed out the need to intensify the struggle against the "great devil," American imperialism, which is the primary enemy not only of the Iranian people but also of all the oppressed peoples in the world.

Khomeyni demanded that all of the Iranian people intensify this struggle against American imperialism, and it took the form of the occupation of the American Embassy by the "students following the imam's line," of that center of conspiracy, of diversion, for the organization of another coup d'etat like the one they organized in 1953.

The documents found in that embassy show that it wasn't truly an embassy, a diplomatic legation, but rather the center of the American imperialist and Iranian counterrevolution against the Iranian revolution.

At present our great struggle is to oppose American imperialism in all its forms: political, economic, military and cultural. We support this thoroughgoing anti-imperialist orientation of the Ayatollah Khomeyni, which is also supported by the great majority of the Iranian people.

With the intensification of that line, the resisting counterrevolutionary forces have adopted new measures, and throughout the country we see plots of various sorts: religious, nationalist, diversionary, in the factories and in the cities.

A major counterrevolutionary plot has come to light in Azerbaijan, and has fortunately been made to fail by the people and by those guiding the revolution, which was a great triumph for the Iranian revolutionary movement.

[Question] The Tudeh Party advocated the formation of a united popular front at the beginning of the revolution. What is its present status?

[Answer] Many points of our program for the united popular front, which we published about 9 months ago, have been carried out. A few days ago we published an additional program, which is the development of the initial plan. This united front has not been officially organized yet, but in actual fact the united front is in the masses and in the political objectives of the great Iranian political groupings.

We see that the measures adopted by the Council of the Revolution in the last 2 months and the measures that the Ayatollah Khomeyni set forth as principles of the revolution agree with many points of our program.

We see, too, that the policy of the revolution's leaders toward our party is not an unfriendly policy. They still aren't at the stage of openly co-operating with our party, but they accommodatingly take all our proposals and all our plans in different spheres. That is, we see in practice results, the influence of our policy, in that sense of common front. We hope that in the future we'll have even more successes in that line.

[Question] In that front, what are the principal groups, tendencies, that can be distinguished?

[Answer] We've said that the front will come into being through cooperation among revolutionary groups that follow Khomeyni's line and the genuine groups of the left, and even somewhat leftist groups.

To name them, they are the groups that follow Khomeyni's line and two political movements, the Mojahedin of the People and the Fedayin of the People, which are genuine revolutionary groups whose present tactics, however, include serious errors.

The Mojahedin have had, until very recently, a policy, a very prudent strategy; but, unfortunately, during recent months, with their abstention in the referendum for the constitution, they have adopted positions that are scarcely comprehensible.

However, in the Fedayin there was a split between leftists and realists, who began to understand the most important points of Iranian policy and adopted prudent positions.

[Question] And in opposition to these groups who is there?

[Answer] In opposition there's the counterrevolution, the liberal bourgeoisie, with all their groups: the National Front, as it's called, the liberal bourgeoisie in the form of the Republican Party of the Moslem People, which organized the plot in Azerbaijan, and dozens of other names that represent that view. There are also groups of the Islamic right, fanatics, who are against the popular and democratic measures of the Khomeyni line.

We also have to count the representatives who are still here of the monarchic regime, officials, the "Savakists" (members of the shah's police, known by the acronym "SAVAK") and the capitalists, the big capital that is playing its role in the counterrevolution.

[Question] What, then, given this panorama, should be considered a correct alliance of classes?

[Answer] The liberal bourgeoisie, with all the counterrevolutionaries, is in one front, and the revolutionary petite bourgeoisie in the city and

the country, the working class and the groups of working class intellectuals are in the other front. But in this people's front the class orientation still hasn't crystallized. The movement is still being guided by Khomeyni. Guided by religion. It can be said that recently crystallization of class consciousness has begun, and now we see very close cooperation between workers' leaders in the movement and the poor peasants and the working petite bourgeoisie. But you have to realize that religion is still the mantle of the movement, which will still take time to assume its concrete class form; for the Iranian revolutionary movement broke out under a religious mantle, with a mixture of religion and revolution.

That's why the proletariat and its expression of class still isn't very clear. The unions still haven't assumed their form, the form of the class struggle, and they're still a cross between a union and a council. Another reason for it is that the Iranian working class is, in its present content, still a very young class. The overwhelming majority of our country's industrial workers have no more than 5 or 6 years of working tradition, for it's during that period that Iranian industry has been developed, after petroleum prices began to rise rapidly in 1972. The great majority of today's workers were previously peasants, villagers, or they belonged to the urban middle class.

[Question] But do the religious people, Khomeyni in particular, reject a class society?

[Answer] They reject it. If they had taken a class direction against the people's movement, the crystallization of class consciousness could have taken place much faster; but the Khomeyni line, and Khomeyni himself, and his real followers, have a very radical orientation in favor of the improvement of the economic situation of the oppressed masses.

This is shown by the nationalization of the banks, of industry, of land; the destruction of feudalism in the towns. That is why they still have considerable influence with the masses, with their religious orientation. All these elements give the Iranian revolution its present shape.

[Question] How, then, can the present situation, status, of the Iranian revolution be defined?

[Answer] We've said that the Iranian revolution is anti-imperialist, democratic and popular. It has made progress in the struggle against imperialism, in the destruction of imperialist positions in Iran. In the democratic orientation, we can see that at present there is a people's democracy, a democracy that hadn't been experienced in the country for 20 years and that we never saw even during the period that the Tudeh Party was a member of a coalition government, in 1945-46. Our party never had, as it does today, this chance to work in this way, openly, throughout the country, without interference from the government. In the course of

the people's struggle, fundamental changes have begun to take place in the country's economic structure as a result of an improvement in the economic and social situation of the oppressed masses. We believe that the Iranian revolution will develop in these three directions.

[Question] What is the Tudeh Party's assessment of the situation of the Iranian armed forces?

[Answer] In large measure, the Iranian armed forces have lost the effectiveness they had during the shah's reign. They were practically destroyed as a force, as a military entity. In the armed forces there are different political orientations, different groups; and there still hasn't been a complete restructuring. They're having severe internal problems: In part, they are the representatives of the shah's regime, in the form of the superior officers and young officers; and they all engage in sabotage. But, on the other hand, the armed forces have lost their authority as a force in the country. Our proposal regarding this was to take very severe, quick steps at the beginning of the revolution to clean out those ranks and build a popular, nationalist, democratic army; but the measures adopted thus far are inadequate.

[Question] There are still other very important problems, such as that of the ethnic minorities in Iran. What is your analysis concerning this?

[Answer] Iran is a multinational country. There are many nationalities living beside the great Iranian nation, which is the Pars, the Farsi, the Persia. Besides the Persians there are very important nationalities, such as the Azerbaijanis, the Kurds, the Arabs, the Baluchis and the Turkomans. The last three are not very numerous, but there are about 10 million Azerbaijanis and several million Kurds. They compose great national units.

Our party was the first in Iranian history to include in its program a democratically based solution to the nationalities issue. In essence it consists of giving the ethnic minorities administrative and cultural autonomy within the framework of a unite country with a central government. We have always fought, throughout our 39-year history, for this friendly, democratic solution to the nationalities issue.

We're very pleased that the Ayatollah Khomeyni has recognized the importance of the nationalities issue and of the rights for which the minorities are fighting in Iran.

He has issued a historic call to the Kurdish people for a solution to these problems, one that we have supported and for which we have proposed a concrete program. The Council of the Revolution and its top officials have presented their program, which has significant positive elements and perhaps can be studied as a basis for discussion leading to its improvement in a few years.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the country's actual economic situation?

[Answer] It's not as disastrous as they think in the West. And it's another of the extraordinary aspects of the Iranian revolution. You can see it in the streets: Nothing has changed. You can find everything. There is no disaster. There are problems: Iranian industry is working at about 75 percent of capacity, except for the petroleum sector, whose production was deliberately reduced because of the country's needs, and the Esfahan metallurgical industry, which is now producing more than before the revolution.

But, naturally, the situation in the other industrial sectors is disquieting. Everything possible must be done to bring about a rapid increase in industrial and agricultural production and in construction. From a financial standpoint, we have problems. Although a lot of its foreign exchange earnings were frozen in the United States and other countries, it still has \$7 billion free that it can use. Petroleum is our daily source of income, and there will be buyers for our petroleum even when the Europeans don't want to buy it. The problems lie in the industrial economy, which is very dependent on capitalist industry and what it supplies; but measures should be taken to reorient our foreign trade and international economic relations.

Moreover, I think that Cuba has shown, in the best way in the world, that an imperialist blockade can't destroy an entire people that wants to defend itself; and there are many possibilities in the international community that we can take advantage of in our economic struggle against imperialism.

There'll be no economic disaster in Iran, as the western politicians predict.

[Question] On 25 January, voting will take place for the election of the first president of the Islamic republic. What is the Tudeh Party's position?

[Answer] We haven't put up a candidate because according to the Iranian constitution, the candidate for this post should have religious qualifications.

We have, however, decided to cooperate with other revolutionary movements following the Khomeyni line and to support the representative who is closest to this line, a representative who surely will be the closest to our present program of political, economic and social reconstruction of Iran. We don't know yet which candidate of those we know of thus far we'll support. We have to study this, hold discussions, meetings and councils, and at the end of this study we'll decide what to do.

For us, there are six candidates who could be important: Bani-Sadr (minister of economy and finance), Admiral Madani (former commander of the Navy), Farsi (assistant secretary general of the Party of the Islamic Republic), Dr Habibi (minister of Science and Higher Education), Daryush Foruhar (Khomeyni's representative for the Kurd region) and Dr Samni (minister of planning).

They all differ in their political characteristics, in their positions or in their personal qualities, and with regard to the Khomeynist line of the revolution.

The Tudeh Party will take a very active part in the parliamentary elections (scheduled for 15 February). It's hard to say whether we'll be successful, for the religious mantle still weighs heavily, and it's difficult for the parties that aren't in those religious groups to do well. But we'll fight for it throughout the country. In any case, it will be a propaganda battle.

[Question] Do you want to add something?

[Answer] Yes. That the Iranian people as a whole, and especially we Iranian communists, wish success to the Cuban Revolution. For us, Cuba is in the front line, the line closest to the imperialists. Cuba is the great passion of the world anti-imperialist movement, and we want you to give the Cuban people and their leaders, the Cuban Communist Party, our very sincere, friendly greetings. We hope that the Cuban people will have further success, for each Cuban success is a great success for the international communist and anti-imperialist movement.

9085
CSO: 4403

ISRAEL

ISRAEL JUDGED NO HELP TO U.S. IN PRESENT CRISIS

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 20 Jan 80 p 1

[Editorial: "America and Israel"]

[Text] An Israeli journalist asked some Americans living in the area what Israel could do to help the United States during its present ordeal.

The unanimous response was that the best thing for Israel to do was to hasten a solution of the Palestinian problem, because it lies behind many incidents and instability.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Sol Linowitz, representative of the American president in the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks gave a carefully-studied speech before the American Council on Foreign Affairs, an organization of political influence and importance. He said that the United States is very preoccupied with Iran and Afghanistan and that the time has come to solve the problem of Palestine which is a principal factor in the instability of the region and the explosion of events there.

Before giving his carefully-studied speech, Linowitz, an American Jew, met with the heads of Jewish organizations in the United States to assure them of his opinion of world events and their relation to the Palestinian problem.

This is the both popular and official opinion of Americans: America is the friend of Israel and even the master of its prosperity, existence and continued survival. Without the United States, Israel cannot live and survive. Its turn has now come to extend a helping hand to its benefactor during the present ordeal as an expression of its gratitude.

The United States of America is now indeed in distress, facing humiliation and the annihilation of its wellbeing. It may even face a hot war and sharp confrontation with the Soviet Union which is approaching the sources of life for the United States and its allies in the West and Japan.

What help has Israel offered the United States? Crazy settlement assaults; seizures of Arabs' property and land; increased "pampering" of the extremists of Gush Emunim, accepting their behavior and conduct; assault economic facilities of the Arabs in Jerusalem; total devotion of all efforts

to make the city Jewish; and harassment of its Arab inhabitants to induce them to emigrate.

This is some of the help Israel is offering its friend, benefactor and guardian of its existence during the present ordeal.

The United States will not find one friend in the region as long as Israel continues this conduct, and as long as the United States is intent on supporting it and not using the big stick to deter it and arouse it from the irreality of daydreaming.

7811
CSO: 4802

ELON MOREH RELOCATES TO HAR-QABIR

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 18 Jan 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Elon Moreh People Have Voted in Favor of Relocating to Har-Qabir"]

[Text] The settlers of Elon-Moreh have reached a final agreement amongst themselves, and by a large majority have voted to relocate to the nearby site of Har-Qabir as their permanent settlement in the Nablus region. The pioneers of settlement in the area, who have endured many difficulties on the way toward achieving their goal, have reached the conclusion that it is their duty to respond to the government's demand, and, in keeping with the court's ruling, to relocate from the site marred by legal enganglement to their permanent home in Har-Qabir.

Thus the issue of relocation comes to an end. Many efforts and a lot of resources have been put into Jebel-Qabir to prepare it for the people of Elon Moreh, who, with God's help, will establish a Jewish city in the heart of Samaria. It is to be a populous city with good relations with Nablus and is to be surrounded by many nearby and far away Jewish settlements.

The pioneer settlers, whose courage enabled them to withstand trials, still have to work hard to get established on the mountainside, to attract more settlers, build an economy and attain their goal forcefully. The prime minister, who patiently dealt with every step of the issue so as to help the settlement out of its difficulties, did a lot for the relocation to Har-Qabir, the symbol of stubbornness and the beginning of mass settlement in Samaria.

There is no better, more vital answer to the autonomy plan, Egyptian style, than the establishment of a Jewish settlement on these rocks, a settlement which exemplifies the sincerity of the belief in Jewish population in Samaria, on land that belongs to the state, without any violation of Arabs' rights to their lands.

The race with autonomy has to be accompanied by more settlements, without much ado, but with implementing whatever has to be carried out, quietly and persistently.

The people of Har-Qabir are calling on candidates for settlement to hurry up and carry out the project of settlement on the mountains of Samaria, the best assurance for the safety of Israeli towns and villages along the coast.

Good luck to the people of Elon Moreh in Har-Qabir.

3646
CSO: 4805

ISRAELI EGYPTIAN CONFRONTATION ON AUTONOMY

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 18 Jan 80 p 2

[Editorial: "The Danger Inherent in Adopting the Egyptian Position on Autonomy"]

[Text] The Egyptian autonomy plan, in total rejection of the Israeli model, includes a parliament of elected representatives which will receive all the responsibilities of the military authorities. All territories, which were under Jordanian rule up to the Six Day War, including East Jerusalem, are to be turned over, as one unit, to the autonomy council. This, if effect, is a plan which will lead to an independent Palestinian rule.

The head of the ministerial delegation for autonomy talks, Dr Joseph Burg, defined the Egyptian proposal as a regres ion to 6 months ago, to the beginning of the negotiations. He added that with the signing of the peace agreement we thought that the era of saying "no" has ended and that the era of saying "yes" has dawned. Now Egypt has termed our proposal "totally unacceptable," and has brought forth a counter proposal which we cannot but term likewise: "totally unacceptable."

According to the Israeli autonomy model, a distinction is made between security, both external and internal, lands and legislation, which are to remain within Israeli authority, and education, religion, labor, housing, health, local police, etc., which are to be within the jurisdiction of the administrative council. These will mean wide authority in local affairs which the people never had under Egyptian rule in the Gaza Strip or under Jordanian rule in Judea and Samaria.

The time of confrontation between Israel and Egypt on basic issues has arrived. Whereas Israel means autonomy for the people, who will have authority over their own affairs when it comes to services, and not autonomy for the territories themselves, which are to remain under Israeli rule, Egypt interprets autonomy as local rule of the people and the territories. Moreover, it considers all areas that were under Jordanian rule, including East Jerusalem, as one geographical unit. The prime minister has defined this plan as a corridor to a Palestinian state.

An Egyptian spokesman has stressed that the model proposed by Israel is only a partial turnover of authority, which, in his opinion, contradicts the Camp David accords, whereas autonomy means complete authority in legislative, judiciary and executive matters. It means a framework and content for Palestinian self-determination.

It should be pointed out that Sadat has repeatedly said that the solution of the Palestinian problem is the basis for a total agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis. He also added that "Jerusalem is the essence of this problem." Although he shrouded his statements with cliches about the possibility of an agreement, he has not budged from his basic position. Now Egypt states unequivocably that it categorically rejects the Israeli proposal and brings forth a counter proposal.

Is there any chance for an agreement between the two sides? At month's end the working committee will convene in Israel for further talks. It should be assumed that secondary issues will be discussed, as has been done up to now, so as to keep contacts between Egypt and Israel going.

The Egyptian delegates are taking a hard line after Israel has returned half of the Sinai including the oilfields. A high price for peace has already been paid. There has been no Egyptian reciprocal concession on autonomy.

Israeli spokesmen have assessed recent developments in Iran and Afghanistan as very threatening to peace in the region and maybe in the whole world. In view of these events, the Palestinian issue has taken second place, since its urgency has dissipated because of a global threat of a Russian attack and the threats of Khomeyni. They also pointed out that the PLO and its allies are Russian satellites, and that it is inconceivable to establish a PLO-Russian base in the heart of the country.

But the American administration still seems to think, as Secretary of State Vance said in an interview, that the solution of the Palestinian problem is the key to the establishment of a pro-west Arab front. In his opinion, extracting Sadat out of his isolation will serve as a central building block of the American Middle East policy. Vance stressed that the administration will push for a stable peace in the region, for which the solution of the Palestinian issue is essential. It can be assumed that the upcoming visit of Ambassador Linowitz to the region is meant to serve this goal.

The gap between the sides as regards the content of autonomy, with the possibility that the American administration may push for a pro-Egyptian solution, which means the establishment of a Palestinian parliament whose authority will include East Jerusalem as well, are bringing us to the brink of a political emergency. The struggle is mostly with the American administration which may weaken our political and defense position by granting full autonomy to the Palestinians. The danger of this is that it may turn out to be a Soviet-Palestinian base for the whole region.

It is mandatory that the bickering between opposition and coalition stop now, and that some accord on the political front be reached, since we are approaching some critical stages. We have to approach those stages with united forces, as much as possible, while we attempt to convince the Americans that autonomy according to Israeli interpretation is in the spirit of the Camp David accords.

8646
CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

BITTER DEBATE OVER CANDIDATE FOR NEXT CHIEF OF STAFF

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Jan 80 pp 11, 14

[Article by Ze'ev Shiff: "Author Assesses Recent Debate Between The Gur and Tal Camps]

[Text The author is writing this article reluctantly, because he would rather not join that madness of fraternal hate as was expressed in the Gur-Tal debate. But in the long run it is impossible not to refer to the social phenomenon of covert hate at the top and to the process by which we have turned into a pack of cruel sharks. It was not a relevant debate to begin with, and it immediately deteriorated to personal subjects. This applied to both sides. Instead of discussing the IDF, they resorted to letting out poison, and to grading each other's performance during the Yom Kippur War in the high command and in the military attache's office in Washington.

It is said that the Second Temple was destroyed because of fraternal hate, and that this kind of hate is even worse than bloodshed. To our chagrin, this is the atmosphere amongst us now. It did not start just recently in disputes between Gur and Tal, Adam and Tal, Rabin and Peres or Sharon, El'azar and Bar-Lev, because in the past a lot was swept under the rug, and many of the hateful struggles took place behind the scene. In recent years this fraternal hate has become a social norm, and everything is now done in the open. It seems that the turning point followed the Yom Kippur War, and started with Sharon's frontal attack on David El'azar and Bar-Lev. Even the "debate" between Weizman and Beni Peled did not contribute much to improve the situation.

The climax was the way Sharon and his colleagues dealt with the then Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur. One may recall the demonstrations in which a dog was marched (alluding to Izit, the canine heroine of Gur's children's books). The lynching in Gonen was but a natural outcome. The man who was hurt in the past now does not hesitate to attack Tal, as if mistakes that the latter made during the Yom Kippur War were deliberate. Last but not least, someone in Tal's camp added fuel to the fire by declaring that on 12 October 1973 Gur requested a cease-fire disregarding the military situation--as if this might help Tal in his debate with Gur. This fraternal hate proves how weak our moral fiber is.

What Reorganization?

The personal struggle is supposedly conducted for the good of the Israeli Defense Forces. To judge by all press excerpts and transcripts of broadcasts that this author has examined, it is doubtful whether even 5 percent was devoted to the subject of the IDF. This also points to the level of the debate. This author has a rather substantiated feeling that some of the participants in the debate did not read Tal's reorganization plan. If we can ignore the hatred, it seems that there are three more substantive issues: the situation within the IDF and the reorganization; the process of deciding on reorganization; the return of Tal to active duty and his candidacy for chief of staff.

Even if Tal had not been appointed to his present job, it would not change the fact that the situation in the IDF after the Yom Kippur War is such that a thorough examination and an internal process of improvement is due. The IDF has doubled since the war. There has been a tremendous growth in equipment and divisions. This fact, coupled with a decrease in the ranks of the high command, created disciplinary problems. Some of that was already felt during the war both in the high command and further down the line. Although the IDF is a very conservative army when it comes to reorganization, nearly everyone agrees that it needs it. The question is only what kind of reorganization.

The reorganization plan presented by Gonen was examined and rejected when Gur was chief of staff. During Eytan's tenure, about a year and a half ago, Tal's proposal, to which Gur also objected to begin with, was also rejected. Eytan explains now that the rejection was not a matter of principle, but was caused by circumstances such as the withdrawal from the Sinai, the realignment of the IDF and his recent assuming of the position of chief of staff. Not that nothing has been accomplished since the war. Some forces were added (some of which Tal would abolish). The main trend was in beefing up the high command. Some departments were added and planning became a branch. As a follow-up, some functions were transferred from the armored forces to the training division, to the point that the latter has become almost a branch. At the same time, it was decided to form a personnel office in the high command.

In spite of all this, and perhaps because of all this beefing up of the high command, the question of proper structure and control of the high command over all forces in times of war has become more acute. Gur claimed that as chief of staff he could make do with the situation as is. But he had no answer to the question of what would happen if the chief of staff were somewhat mediocre and had a somewhat weaker high command.

This author tends to think that the approach which has been adopted, of beefing up the high command, is mistaken, and that Tal's proposal (or even Gonen's more restricted plan) is better and has a better chance of improving the field forces and the ability of the high command to control them. It

also leaves room for strategic planning and better coordination with the Air Force. At this point, it is difficult to know what the implications of a reorganization may be. The decision took place in the midst of another reorganization—the establishment of the personnel office, and the broadening of the responsibilities of the training division to the point of it being responsible for a training facility in the south. It is clear that two reorganization processes cannot coexist. If the training division continues to function as in the present, even if a field command is established, all bright ideas serve no end. Waste and with it inefficiency will grow.

A Clandestine Decision

The question of how the decision on reorganization and on recalling Tal to active duty has been arrived at is another story. There are those who claim that this is an example of how often major decisions are arrived at. It justifiably raised anger and discontent among many of the major generals who claim that decisions, which are as important to the IDF as this one, are approved behind their backs, as if they were the enemy. Even the deputy chief of staff was not in the discussion between the chief of staff and the defense minister. Eytan denies that his arm was twisted and that he was forced to agree to what he had objected to in the past. As to the fact that the resolution was brought to a high command meeting as a fait accompli, and that everyone emerged from the meeting directly to a press conference, the chief of staff says that discussion on the issue had already been held in the past, that opinions were known, and that it made no sense to start everything all over again.

It is true that an army is not run in a democratic fashion, and that the high command forum is not that of the Knesset, where decisions are voted upon. The defense minister can also claim that the government is ultimately responsible, and that it approved the reorganization in a ministerial committee. It is also obvious that the high command is not a kindergarten class, and that the major generals are not school children. The goal, among others, is to attain cooperation, not a storm of protests which will probably be expressed later on, when Tal's implementation staff presents its proposals.

What are Major General Gur's main complaints against Tal? Gur claims that under no circumstances should Tal be appointed chief of staff, because of his past behavior and because of events surrounding the Yom Kippur War and the period immediately following it. In other words, Gur is addressing himself to what may happen when Eytan steps down as chief of staff. The question of the appointment of the next chief of staff is not now on the agenda, but Gur and others claim that Weizman has already made promises to Tal, and that there is a package deal. No one knows about it in Eytan's office, and no one there believes that such a package deal exists. It is possible that Weizman gave some hints, but it is hard to believe that an actual promise has been made.

A few months ago, Weizman proposed to Tal to step down from his senior position in the reserves and pass it on to a younger major general. Why should he now rush and offer him the position of chief of staff, especially since it is not even clear that it will indeed be Ezer Weizman who will be in a position to nominate the next chief of staff?

It is possible that Gur objects not only to Tal's candidacy, but also to recalling him to active duty. Thus, this author fails to understand why Chief of Staff Gur appointed Tal commander of the reserves. At the time of the appointment, Gur knew what he now knows about Tal. Is there no contradiction between what he says today about recalling Tal, and his decision, as chief of staff, regarding Tal's appointment?

When the new high command was discussed, the new job was first offered to Herzl Shapir, but Chief of Staff Eytan objected. It was also said that Shapir wanted an early promise that he would replace Eytan, a promise which was never made. In the end Eytan offered Tal the new position. This is his prerogative, just as it was Gur's prerogative to appoint Tal to his previous job.

As to the future, this author finds it hard to believe that Tal will get the nod to become chief of staff. This author doubts that Tal may even want the job. He will then be closer to 60 than to 50, and this is an important factor. Whatever the opinion on Gur's words may be, it is difficult to envision an arrangement with the defense minister and the government insisting on Tal's candidacy to the end, in view of objections of the nature that Gur brought up. In any event, those who hoped--for political, personal or other reasons--that Tal would immediately displace Eytan, accomplished only one thing. They increased the chance that Eytan's term will be extended by 1 year.

8646
CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

LAGGING ISRAELI PRODUCTIVITY DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Jan 80 p 9

[Article (second and last in a series): "Industry Workers Contribute To Improve Israeli Productivity Picture"]

[Text] The dismal picture of the ability of the average Israeli worker is offset by the increase in the productivity of [Israeli] production workers as compared with their counterparts in the developed industrial countries.

Between 1970 and 1978 industrial productivity in Israel went up by about 5 percent annually. This rate is higher than that of Japan, Italy, Canada, Sweden and the United States. It was, however, lower than that of Denmark, France or Germany.

In the 8 years under consideration, real [Israeli] industrial productivity, in terms of constant prices, increased by 6.3 percent. Following the Israeli average was the Canadian average of 4.5 percent. At the bottom of the scale was the Swedish increase of 0.5 percent.

Additional Accomplishments

One ought to remember that during these years, the total number of man hours in [Israeli] industry increased by 1.5 percent annually, whereas in most of the countries under comparison the number of man hours declined by 1 to 3 percent. The trend toward a 5 day work week has only started in Israel whereas in some other countries the work week is 4 days.

Israeli industry can take credit for one more accomplishment: during these years unit costs, expressed in dollars, increased by about 6.6 percent annually. When other labor costs are considered, also expressed in dollars, it turns out that the rate of increase in Israel was the lowest of all countries under comparison with the exception of the United States and Canada. This considerably improves the competitiveness of Israeli industrial products.

[Israeli] wages, per unit of production, expressed in local currency, increased by 28.8 percent, a higher rate than any other country considered. Israel is immediately followed by Italy with an increase of 15.1 percent, about half that of the Israeli rate.

Israel can claim one more record: hourly wages, in dollars, including fringe benefits, are \$2.80. This is the lowest figure among all countries considered. Between 1970 and 1978, [Israeli] labor costs, in constant prices, went up by about 4 percent annually. Changes in labor costs in these years stemmed from an annual increase in nominal labor costs of about 35 percent and an average of 29 percent increase in the cost of living index.

**Basic Production Per Person
(in dollars)
1970-1978**

<u>Country</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1978</u>
Sweden	4,090	10,410
Germany	3,100	10,330
U.S.A.	4,860	9,660
Canada	3,900	8,880
France	2,860	8,790
Japan	1,910	8,500
Great Britain	2,180	5,490
Italy	1,730	4,180
Israel	1,640	3,880

In Sweden, which holds the record, industrial labor wages are \$9.80 per hour; in Germany, \$9.48 and in the United States, \$8.35. In Great Britain, second from the bottom, hourly wages for industrial workers are \$4.24, 51 percent more than in Israel. Economist Nadya Levy maintains that at the present rate no major changes can be expected in the near future.

Mr Yoram Barzilai, manager of the Economic Institute of the Histadrut, is aware of the wage gap between Israeli workers and those overseas. He also points out that Israeli productivity is lower than that in other countries. He proposes to allow raises in real wages to depend on productivity.

Some Success for Incentives

Dov Loutman, acting president of the Industrialists' Association, is of the opinion that incentives implemented in industry have succeeded, and that the method should be adopted in other sectors as well. In his opinion the attempt of Israeli workers to attain higher wages for less work caused Israel to be at the bottom of the wage scale among developed countries.

General manager of the Institute for Productivity and Production claims that it is precisely the low wages that allow Israel some flexibility which could be utilized to increase efficiency and productivity. He thinks that the time has come to cease pressure to lower wages, and that production should be raised via higher productivity. Productivity affects wages just as wages affect productivity.

According to Mr Meldan, the obvious conclusion from the data is that in the next few years we should continue developing industry and agriculture, while at the same time we ought to shift most efforts to increased efficiency in construction and services. This effort is to be in addition to efforts to improve the public sector.

8646

CSO: 4805

ANALYSIS OF NEW JORDANIAN CABINET

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 14-20 Jan 80 p 20

[Article by AL-DUSTUR's correspondent in Amman: "A Cabinet of Technocrats Whose Slogan Is 'A New Jordan'"]

[Text] The government of Mr Mudhar Badran has departed after setting a record in Jordanian cabinet history. It had stayed in power for more than 40 months. After the departure of this "long-living" government, came a new government under the leadership of 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf, who has proclaimed the slogan of a "new Jordan" and is seemingly relying on the "technocrats" to carry out this motto.

What are the bases and principles which the government has adopted [to guide] its course on the local, Arab, and international levels?

Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf has declared, from the moment he took office as head of the cabinet, that his government has adopted the bases and principles which King Husayn established in his letter of appointment [to the post of prime minister]. In his statement on behalf of the cabinet, which Prime Minister Sharaf read to the National Advisory Council, he defined these principles in detail and announced the principal guidelines which his government will follow [in pursuing] the path of the "new Jordan."

On the local level Prime Minister Sharaf concentrated on the integrity of government, "because a clean government is one that is deserving of the people's confidence, has the right to conduct a dialogue with its citizens, and to expect their respect and cooperation." The new prime minister attacked corruption, bribery, [exploitation for] personal gain, and deviation [from duty]. He promised that there will be justice for all citizens and that government agencies will be open to the people for dealing with their problems, rights and demands.

The cabinet statement concentrated on the economic situation, saying that the government will grant special priority to the study of economic

problems and orienting the national economy, wherever deemed necessary, in order to keep the economic momentum moving forward, especially since the government is deeply aware of the fact that Jordanian society is moving in erroneous directions as a consumer society--directions which are not suitable for balanced conditions of growth, nor for conditions of its confrontation with the enemy, and the pressures of the international situation around us. The new government is taking into consideration changing this situation and climate of slackness and anarchy in consumption. Also, the new Jordanian government has made a place in its program, and within its priorities, for dealing with the problem of migration of the inhabitants from the countryside to the city, and preventing the leaps and contradictions caused by uneven development in society and in uncurbed economic growth. This concern also includes the issues of labor and the workers.

For the first time there emerges concern for the role of women in the advancement of society since the government has declared that women will be fully integrated into the growth process, after having been idle for centuries, and women will enjoy complete equality within the framework of full participation along with men in building the country. The process of having women participate in the new cabinet has been a practical and actual indication of [how] the path has been opened for women, inasmuch as Mrs In'am al-Mufti has entered the government and occupied the post of minister of social development. This is the first time in Jordan's history that a woman has served in the cabinet.

Jordan's Role in the Arab World

The new government possesses the characteristics of a domestic reform movement, and its insistence on this step appears candid and optimistic. Concerning Jordan's policy in the Arab world, the new prime minister has broadly-based contacts in the Arab world because of his long experience in important posts. The government will stress a policy toward the Arab world which will show its awareness and involvement, and, in the framework of Jordan's own course, [the government] will work toward supporting the Arab solidarity as well as cooperation and complete harmony with fellow-Arab countries. Jordan, within the Arab world, is striving to build its own strength in all fields--material, moral, civilian, and military--strength which is able to confront the winds of disintegration and weakness which nowadays are blowing upon the Arab countries, especially after the success of the conspiracy to deviate Egypt's leadership away from acting in accordance with the Arabs, plunge it into the trap of isolation, and [induce it to] renounce its rights under the formulas of Camp David and the deviations which resulted from them. The new government adheres to Jordan's position concerning the Palestinian people and their rights. It considers a confrontation with aggression to be a confrontation for all the Arabs, in which it will bear its responsibilities, just as the other Arab confrontation states and forces, backed by forces rallied by

the entire Arab nation, bear their responsibilities. For this reason, the Jordanian government supports the resolutions of the two summit conferences held in Baghdad and Tunis. And it will work as hard as possible toward strengthening [these resolutions] by means of joint action and building up its own strength. Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf emphasized that Jordan will always stand by the people in the occupied lands as they wage their struggle and staunchly resist until they attain their salvation and freedom. As for relations with the PLO, Prime Minister Sharaf has not been far from [adopting the position of] Jordan conducting a dialogue with the PLO. He is abreast of all the details concerning Jordanian-Palestinian relations. The new prime minister has assured that Jordan "is closely involved with the rights, grievances, and aspirations of the Palestinians," and that the Jordanian government will commit itself to [accepting] the consequences of this responsibility, which is the basis of Jordan's policy toward the Palestinian problem. [And he assured that]"the government will work together, sincerely, with the PLO and with the Arab states in the interests of the Palestinian people, to uphold their national rights, and [in the interests of] their triumphant future in their own land."

In order to undertake this role, which was defined by the government in its political statement, it is necessary to have a strong army. "Therefore the government will work on increasing [the army's] strength and consolidating its armaments and equipment." Prime Minister Sharaf emphasized that the government will continue to allocate a large part of the national budget toward consolidating and strengthening the army.

This is the new Jordanian government which has defined its course and its program in the cabinet declaration, and it appears, as we have mentioned, that this new Jordanian government, which is composed of 22 ministers, is serious about carrying out its plans and is serious about interacting with the people's demands.

9468
CSO: 4802

JORDAN

REPORT ON THE MILITARY

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14-20 Jan 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Tawfiq Nakhlah Ibrahim: "Jordan--the Bedouins Are the Basis of Its Army, and Its Policy Is Against the Source of Its Weapons"]

[Text] Twenty percent of the national budget is for transforming it from a professional army into a national army. Jordan is pursuing a conscious policy of modernizing its army, and is not striving, in any way at all, to become a new arsenal of weapons in the Middle East.

The army is the "spoiled child" in the Jordan of King Husayn, who in 1978 set aside the amount of \$304 million [dollars] for it. This is an increase of \$103 million more than in 1977, and \$149 million more than in 1976. This amount of money, which exceeded \$300 million last year, represents approximately 20 percent of the national budget. The purpose of these expenditures is the modernization of the Jordanian Army and the financing of its transformation from a professional army into a national army.

Since 1976 Jordan has had compulsory military service, with the period of service lasting 2 years, and new blood has been brought into the army which is capable of turning it into an instrument which is effective--as it already is now--and strong. Since the time of the British, the days of Glubb Pasha (1956), the Jordanian Army has maintained its military discipline, traditions of professionalism and firm cohesion. The Jordanian Army is still a professional army, with a strength of 67,850 (including 30,000 reserves) drawn from a total of 2,900,000 citizens who comprise the total number of inhabitants [in Jordan]. The Bedouins, most of whose origins go back to non-Jordanian tribes (mainly Saudi and Iraqi), constitute the largest number of those recruited. Their traditional loyalty to the tribe has been transformed into loyalty to the king. This has made them an important element of stability, and they are less susceptible to being affected by the political influences which the inhabitants of the cities and villages are subject to. The Bedouins have always been outside [all] the conspiracies. Their educational level, which has prevented them from being able to use airplanes and artillery, has made

them serve primarily in the ranks of the infantry and armored corps. But since the importance of both the artillery corps and the air force is growing, the importance of the Bedouins inside the Jordanian Army is liable to diminish. Bear in mind, [however], that King Husayn is not prepared to "sacrifice" the Bedouins in the interests of modernizing his army. He owes to them his victory during the 1970 crisis. For many years the Bedouins will remain the backbone of the Jordanian Army, to which the king grants a great number of privileges in the form of social services.

In spite of the modernization process going on right now, the Jordanian Army will remain primarily a land army. The explanation for this is to be found in the geography of the country, which consists of desert areas which it is necessary to patrol, bearing in mind that it is necessary for this land force to play the role of a deterrent in the face of Israel and some of the neighboring countries.

The land force numbers 61,000 men, distributed among 2 armored units, 2 mechanized units, 2 infantry units, 4 battalions of "special forces" (which are trained in urban warfare and, in 1970, were used against the Palestinians in the battle in Amman), and 2 artillery brigades.

American and English

This army's equipment is American and English-made. All of the new equipment is American, whereas the English equipment is older and there is less of it.

The number of armored vehicles is 520 [sic], including medium-sized tanks (200 English Centurions), 320 M-47/48 tanks and 60 American tanks. The "Centurion" tank, the design of which goes back to the period after World War II, weighs 52 tons and is equipped with a 105-mm cannon and 2 machine guns. It is a strong tank which showed its power in the Arab-Israeli wars. But its speed (34 km per hour) and the thickness of its armor make it an obsolete tank. For the purpose of replacing it, last October Jordan studied [the possibilities of] purchasing new modern tanks. The Western news media had broadcast the fact that the United States' displeasure with Jordan's position vis-a-vis the Camp David agreements had led it to refuse to sell to Jordan Chrysler M-60 tanks. However, official sources in the Jordanian embassy in Paris indicated that the U.S. has not shown any such refusal [to sell]. Other news items indicated that Jordan is trying to buy "(Shir)" (Super Chieftain) tanks made by the British. The "(Shir)" tank is equipped with a 12-cylinder diesel engine, made by the Rolls Royce Co., and with a 120-mm cannon, guided by laser beams. But Britain wants the prospective buyers of these tanks to finance the assembly system that was set up to produce 2,000 tanks for the former shah of Iran. This may make the Jordanians think about the matter for a long time.

It should be pointed out that the Americans have indicated to their traditional allies in the area--including King Husayn--that they are prepared to be very cooperative concerning matters of weapons payments.

Besides the "Centurion" tanks, Jordan needs to replace its M-47 Chrysler tanks which were designed in 1945, which move at a speed of 45 km per hour, and which are equipped with very old 90-mm cannons. But there is no urgent need to replace the M-47 tanks, which are still capable of rendering numerous services. The new armored vehicle which the Jordanian Army has is the M-60 Chrysler tank, which moves at a speed of 48 km per hour and is equipped with a (British) 105-mm cannon. The army has about 860 light armored vehicles which are used in reconnaissance missions and for maintaining security, whereas 140 4-wheel (Firih) [armored] vehicles are [each] used by 2 soldiers and are equipped with a 7.62 caliber Browning machine gun. In spite of how old they are, these [armored] vehicles can be equipped with anti-tank rocket [launchers] and maintain an effective speed (93 km per hour). Also, the 6-wheel (Sarakin) personnel carriers (carrying 10 men), of which Jordan has about 120 (they are 28 years old), are still suitable for operations carried out by the internal security forces by virtue of their silent motor. Jordan also has 600 American M-113 amphibious personnel transports. This type of transport is able to take 13 men a distance of 320 km without stopping.

Infantry

The Jordanian infantry, which is, in particular, equipped with American M-16 offensive rifles, enjoys the support of the artillery corps. This corps has 110 English (Bwandr Chan)-25 cannons which have a range of 12 km and a caliber of 88 mm. But the disadvantages of these cannons are their age and their weight (1-1/2 tons). The other artillery pieces are all American-made, bearing in mind that some of them are obsolete, especially the 105-mm (Twid) howitzer M-101 cannon (which goes back before World War II), the 203-mm M-115 cannon, and the 155-mm M(I)FG cannon.

The Jordanian Army's mortars are American-made and are of a caliber of 81 mm, 107 mm, and 120 mm. The first step in the field of [advanced] technology, undertaken by the Jordanian Army in recent years, was the purchase of American (Tu) anti-tank rocket launchers. This rocket launcher, which weighs 18 kg and has a range of 3.7 km, can be mounted on a jeep, put on a Cobra patrol vehicle, or put on an M-113 tank. Also, Jordan has recently obtained Dragoon M-47 antitank rocket launchers, which have been manufactured since 1972 by the MacDouglas Corp. in America. This rocket launcher is fired from the shoulder (the type especially made for the infantry) or can be mounted on an M-113 tank (the type especially made for tanks). Its range is 1 km, it weighs 12 kg, and has an infra-red guidance system. It can also be equipped with a new night-vision system (the (AN)/TAS-4 system). Jordan also asked (in May 1979) the United States for 150 M-113 personnel transports. The anti-aircraft rocket

Launchers which the Jordanians have are the American type "Red Eye." This rocket launcher is fired from the shoulder and has a range of 3 km. The 200 American-made 40-mm M-42 anti-aircraft cannons are without radar. Thus, the Red Eye rocket launchers constitute the entire anti-aircraft defense system within Jordan's territory.

Air Force

Since the Jordanian Air Force does not constitute a powerful obstacle for the 549 fighter planes which Israel has, Jordan has found itself forced to acquire a new, effective weapon. This explains the policy which has been pursued in this realm during the last 3 years and [explains] the rise in the budget for the Jordanian Army. New purchases have included 100 Vulcan anti-aircraft cannons. A cannon of this type fires 6,000 rounds per minute and its cartridge clip holds 11,000 rounds. Jordan has also acquired (Ambrufid) Hawk rocket launchers which weigh 580 kg and are capable of hitting targets at an altitude of between 30 [sic] and 11 thousand meters. This weapon is very effective, but it requires important logistic support. The price that the Jordanian Army is paying for a single rocket launcher of this type is \$120,000.

In spite of the high price of this weapon, it is necessary in order to make up for the gap suffered by the Jordanian Air Force, which has 78 fighter planes and 6,650 men. The air force has 60 American-made F-5 Tiger-2 bombers, manufactured by the Northrup Corp. These planes are equipped with two 30-mm cannons and rockets, missiles, and bombs of different types which are produced by the U.S. Then there is a squadron of 18 interceptor planes of the type F-104 Star Fighter (made by the Lockheed Corp.), which are equipped with Sidewinder rocket launchers. Bear in mind that these planes are not capable of dealing with the American fighter planes which Israel has acquired and which are of the type F-16 and F-15 Eagle. It should be pointed out that Jordan, on 14 Jan 79, submitted a request to France for 36 F-1 Mirage planes. Likewise, at the beginning of 1978, Jordan submitted a request for fighter planes from the U.S.

The request included 10 (Bill) reconnaissance planes and 5 F-5 planes (May 1979).

Navy

The navy has 10 vessels for patrol missions. It constitutes the Jordanian fleet which is not equipped for naval warfare. These vessels patrol the port of Aqaba and its surroundings. Jordan pursues a conscious policy of military independence. It does not, in any way, strive to become a new weapons arsenal in the Middle East, bearing in mind that a conscious policy of modernizing the Jordanian Army's weapons and increasing its military capability is necessary. But Jordan's limited financial resources, and the uncertainty of the situation in the area, which forces Jordan (officially) to condemn the policy followed by its most important source of arms (the U.S.), both constitute obstacles which cannot be ignored.

JORDAN

BRIEFS

NEW JORDANIAN ARMAMENTS--King Husayn ordered that the name Khalid ibn al-Walid be given to the Super Sherman tank which Jordan has received and which is equipped with a 120-caliber cannon that has a firing accuracy of 99 percent. AL-HAWADITH has learned that Jordan, as a result of an arms deal with Britain, has received 320 Super Sherman tanks, which are superior to the Soviet-made T-72 tank. This is part of its effort to transform its infantry into an armored corps. Jordan also received, as a result of a deal with France, a number of Mirage-1 planes, since the use of Mirage-5 planes is restricted to the French armed forces. Jordan received a (Kratal) missile system. This is in addition to the Hawk air missile system which Jordan received last year. [Text]
[London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Jan 80 p 9] 9468

CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

KFAED GRANTS LOANS TO TURKEY, OTHER STATES

Kuwait AL-STYASAH in Arabic 22 Jan 80 p 4

[Article: "Al-'Atiqi Signs Three Loans From Kuwait Fund to Sudan, Turkey and Sri Lanka"]

[Text] Kuwait granted three loans yesterday to Sudan, Sri Lanka and Turkey totaling 4.87 million dinars.

According to the loan agreements with Sudan, the KFAED will provide a loan in the amount of 1.3 million dinars to participate in the financing of the al-Rahad roads project.

The loan allocated to Sri Lanka consists of 570,000 dinars to finance a urea fertilizer project, and the loan to Turkey consists of 3 million dinars to finance a water mains project for Istanbul.

Signing the loan agreements on behalf of the KFAED was the chairman plenipotentiary of the board of directors, Finance Minister 'Abd-al-Rahman Salim al-'Atiqi. Signing for the other sides were the Sudanese ambassador to Kuwait, Musa 'Awad Balal, for Sudan; the director of foreign revenues of the Finance Ministry, S. (Vilaytham), for Sri Lanka; and the senior adviser to the general director of the treasury, (Bulent Baya Syuglu), for Turkey.

The project agreement was signed on behalf of the General Water Installations Administration by Mustafa Yaziki, the administration's assistant general director, and on behalf of the Istanbul Water Administration by (Dogan Hetet), that organization's assistant general director.

The KFAED loan to Sudan will be used in the construction of an asphalt-paved main road, which will be 84 kilometers long and have an asphalted layer 6.5 meters wide, as well as asphalt-paved secondary roads with a combined length of approximately 70 kilometers and an asphalted layer 5.5 meters wide.

These roads will connect the 300,000-feddan al-Rahad agricultural project with the highway between Wad Madani and al-Qadarif. This will facilitate

the importation of production inputs and the exportation of agricultural products, as well as facilitating transportation within the al-Rahad agricultural project.

The KFAED loan covers 13.5 percent of the total costs of the project. It will run for 28 years, which includes a 3-year grace period, at an annual interest rate of 2.5 percent. The supplementary loan which the KFAED will provide to Sri Lanka will be used to meet the increased costs of the urea fertilizer project which the KFAED previously took part in financing with a 7.5-million-dinar loan.

The supplementary loan along with the remainder of the original loan will be earmarked for the financing of the foreign-currency costs of the management contract for the project, which has entered its final stages of implementation and is expected to begin production next May.

The supplementary loan contains the same stipulations and conditions as the original loan, and specifies an annual interest rate of 3.5 percent and a term of 15 years.

The loan which the KFAED is providing to Turkey will be used in the construction of approximately 40 kilometers of water mains made of steel and prestressed concrete in the European section of Istanbul.

The project also includes the provision of the steel cables to fabricate the prestressed concrete pipes and the furnishing of spare parts needed for the plant, as well as the defrayment of the costs of engineering consulting services.

The KFAED loan covers 21 percent of the costs of the project. It will run for a period of 20 years at an annual interest rate of 4 percent.

8591
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KUWAIT

TRADE AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH FINLAND

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 18 Jan 80 p 4

[Report on press conference with Finnish Minister of Foreign Trade Esko Rekola, by Babakr Hasan Makki: "The Visit Resulted in the Signing of Some Trade Agreements Between Kuwaiti and Finnish Businessmen"]

[Text] Mr Esko Rekola, the Finnish minister of foreign trade, has affirmed his country's desire to go directly forward with the broadening of the horizons of commercial exchange with Kuwait in particular and the countries of the Arab homeland in general.

At a midday press conference yesterday in the Kuwait Hilton Hotel upon the conclusion of his visit, Mr Rekola said that after further trade talks between the two countries, the signing of contracts for the construction of a water distillation station in Kuwait has become definite, and the station will probably be expanded to include electric power.

The Finnish trade minister referred to a project to finance the Kuwait harbor and expressed his pleasure with it. He said: "Finland is very active in this project, especially with respect to the warehouses included in it." At another point in the press conference, which was also attended by the Finnish ambassador to Kuwait, Mr (Rekoli), the minister touched on the project involving the Al-Sayf Palace building.

"A short while ago we visited the Al-Sayf Palace's new building, which I expect will be a tremendous development project, and I would like to mention here that the engineers participating in this project are Finnish engineers."

Trade Relations in the Private Sector

In response to a question from AL-SIYASAH concerning the results of the minister's visit with the private sector and the companies and whether this visit had led to the signing of any agreements between businessmen of the two countries, Esko Rekola said: "We have had personal contacts with some Kuwaiti businessmen since we have agreed on some of the main items on the

horizons of trade cooperation between the two sectors, and we hope that we will complete the process with them during the coming days through our mutual visits." He added: "We now have about 12 representatives from the largest companies in Finland in our delegation, and they have carried on intense activity with Kuwaiti businessmen pertaining to the signing of additional agreements."

The minister went on to say: "At this point I would like to point out that Kuwait's imports from Finland have increased three times over what they were 3 years ago."

Commercial Exchange Agreement Between the Two Countries

The Finnish minister touched on the subject of the trade agreement concluded between the two countries and the things that have been accomplished with regard to the agreement during this visit. He said: "During our meetings, we examined the bases of the trade agreement between the two countries in order to broaden the horizon of trade and economic cooperation, and we agreed to follow and pursue this agreement which will lead to the opening up of many more economic and trade horizons between us."

Trade Relations With the Arab Countries

The Finnish minister of trade praised the trade cooperation between Finland and the countries of the Arab homeland, saying: "Our products for the Arab market have increased 5 percent over what they were last year. Moreover, this visit has included discussion of numerous trade projects in the Arab states, especially the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the ARE and Iraq." He added: "We now have a big project to build a conference hall in Bahrain, as well as a similar project in Iraq."

Oil and Energy Sources

In the course of his conversation, the Finnish trade minister had the following to say with regard to whether or not any oil agreements had been concluded during his current visit: "We have certainly tried to lay the foundations for commercial exchange between us in the area of oil, but I cannot, at present, confirm what has been accomplished in this area since the discussions are still in progress." Mr Rekola went on to say: "The main purpose of our visit is to open areas of technological commercial exchange."

Concerning the sources from which Finland imports its oil, the Finnish minister said: "We import 400 million barrels from the Middle East and 700 million barrels from the Soviet Union. We have a commitment not to buy from or deal with unrecognized and unofficial markets since we deal only with the OPEC price."

Trade Policy

In response to another question from AL-STYASAH concerning the nature of the trade relations between Finland and Israel, the Finnish minister said that his country has diplomatic relations with Israel and every other country of the world, and he affirmed that Finland is a neutral country and has no alignments with any other state. Moreover, it adheres completely to all resolutions of the United Nations, the purpose of this being to place Finland within the active and effective international group in the United Nations and the Security Council. He said: "For this reason, political activity between Finland and the Arab world has been, and continues to be, good."

Gratitude and Pleasure

At the conclusion of his press conference, which lasted roughly an hour, the Finnish minister saluted the amir, the government and the people of Kuwait for the expressions of friendship and welcome they displayed toward him. He also praised the great accomplishments he has witnessed in the state of Kuwait and the distinct impression made on him in various areas of life among the Kuwaiti people.

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CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

LOAN TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA--AL-SIYASAH has learned that contacts have taken place during recent days between officials of the PRC and a number of Kuwaiti financial organizations, foremost among them the KFAED, the Kuwaiti Investment Company and the National Bank. The aim of these contacts is to obtain a Kuwaiti loan to participate in the implementation of some investment projects in China. AL-SIYASAH learned that the Chinese Government has extended an invitation to 'Abd-al-Latif al-Hamad and representatives of a number of Kuwaiti financial and investment activities to visit China, examine the investment opportunities there, and discuss the establishment of joint cooperation between the two countries and the setting up of investment companies with capital provided jointly by both countries. [Text] [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 2 Jan 80 p 5] 8591

CSO: 4802

REGULATIONS OF OFFICERS DISCIPLINARY COUNCIL APPROVED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 5 Jan 80 p 4

[Article: "Reorganization of Army Officers' Disciplinary Council; Council of Ministers Charged Jubran To Introduce Amendments to It"]

[Text] In its most recent session the Council of Ministers approved in principle the statute that seeks to reorganize the disciplinary council and its trial principles so as to implement the new National Defense Act. The Council of Ministers charged Minister of Justice Jubran to convene a meeting for the purpose of adding some legal language to the text of the statute so that it would be presented to the Council of Ministers at its next session.

The text of the statute follows.

Section One: General Provisions

Article One: This statute determines the reorganization of the Officers' Disciplinary Council and its trial principles in accordance with the stipulations of Article 81 of the National Defense Act.

Article Two: In this statute the word, "Council" refers to the Officers' Disciplinary Council; the term, "the body of the Council" refers to the chairman and the members of the Council; the term, "the government's representative" refers to the government's representative to the Officers' Disciplinary Council; the term, "the indicted officer" refers to the officer who was indicted by the Council.

Section Two: The Composition of the Council: Removal from the Council

Article Three: The Council is appointed by statute at the suggestion of the minister of national defense. It consists of [the following]:

A general officer presiding;

Two officers at colonel's rank and higher: two members;

One officer at colonel's rank and higher: the government's representative.

The rank of the chairman, the members and the government's representative must not be lower than that of the indicted officer.

Article Four: No person can participate in the Council or in representing the government on the Council who is related to the indicted officer by:

- A. Blood or marriage to the fourth degree;
- B. Having taken part in the complaint, which is the subject of the indictment, and by virtue of his position, expressed an opinion on it or imposed on the indicted officer a penalty because of one of the actions attributed to him in the indictment decree;
- C. Documented hostility or legal disputes between him and the indicted officer.

Article Five: The chairman, a member or the government's representative is to request in writing that he be excused from the Council if one of the conditions stipulated in Article Four exists. The indicted officer may also request that anyone who meets the afore-mentioned conditions be excused from the Council.

Article Six: A request for removal must be submitted in writing to the Council before a trial. The Council looks into it without the participation of the member whose removal from the Council is being requested. The Council is to grant or reject the request with due cause.

If the cause for removal had not taken place or had not been known of until after the trial began, the Council is to suspend its consideration of the case until the request for removal is settled immediately and on an emergency basis.

Article Seven: If the Council approves the request for removal, the officer in question is to be replaced with another in accordance with the method determined by the law in forming the Council.

Section Three: The Council's Mandate

Article Eight: The Council is to look into the momentous professional violations that are brought before it by one of the principal organizations that were mentioned in Article Four of the National Defense Act in accordance with the basic rules of indictment in this statute.

Article Nine: The penalties that may be imposed by the Council are those which are stated in Article Two of Section 78 of the National Defense Act.

Article Ten: If the indicted officer commits a violation in the course of the trial, the Council may put him on trial immediately in an area within its jurisdiction, provided that it impose a penalty suitable to the new violation within the final decision of the principal case.

If the violation is outside the jurisdiction of the Council, or if the violation was committed by a witness in the case, the Council is to submit a report on the matter to the minister of national defense, and this is to be recorded in the official report of the proceedings.

Article Eleven: If it becomes evident that the indicted officer or any other person did commit a violation that was not related to the violation which is the subject of the indictment, the Council is to submit a report on this matter to the minister of national defense, and it is to record this in the official report of its proceedings.

Section Four: The Principles of Indictment by the Council

Article Twelve: A decision to have officers arraigned by the Council is made by the minister of national defense at the suggestion of the chief of the principal organization with which the officer in question is affiliated. The decision is made with the approval of the military council.

Article Thirteen: The indictment decision is to be reported as soon as it is issued to the Council, to the government representative, the military council, the army command, to the principal organization with which the indicted officer is affiliated, and to the indicted officer, who is to be notified by the principal organization with which he is affiliated.

Article Fourteen: The indictment decision is to include a determination of the charge leveled against the indicted officer.

Article Fifteen: The indictment decision is to be sent to the chairman of the Council along with the necessary documents. A detailed report on the circumstances of the case, a statement of the services of the officer to be arraigned, the code of professional rewards and punishments, and [a record of] the rewards that were won by that officer are to be attached.

Article Sixteen: The chairman of the Council is to turn the complete file over to the government's representative to carry out the investigation. This is to be done within 3 days of its receipt.

Article Seventeen: The Military Chamber--the Department of Legal Affairs and Military Justice--is to carry out the administrative functions that this Council usually performs. The president of the chamber is to appoint one of the officers to record the proceedings of the trial sessions.

Section Five: Investigation Activities

Article Eighteen: The government representative is to summon the officer who is to be investigated. This officer has the right to request that the testimony of defense witnesses be heard. If the indicted officer stays away from the investigation, the government's representative is to pursue his work and to make a record of the indicted officer's absence in the official report.

An indicted officer has the right to seek the assistance of one of the officers or attorneys for his own defense during the investigation or during the trial sessions. If the indicted officer refuses to appoint a representative [to defend him], the government representative is to ask the chairman of the Council to appoint one of the officers as his representative.

Article Nineteen: The government's representative may hear the testimony of prosecution witnesses and then of defense witnesses without the presence of the indicted officer in the context of the charges and the court cases that are mentioned in the indictment decision. He is to record their statements in a special report, and he may conduct interviews with them or between them and the indicted officer when that is necessary. He may also decline to summon any witness whose testimony he thinks will not be beneficial.

If one of the witnesses fails to show up, hearing his testimony may be dispensed with, and this is to be recorded in the investigation report. Both the indicted officer or the witness are to sign their [respective] statements. If any one of them declines to do so, the government's representative is to make a note of this in a postscript to the report.

Article Twenty: After completing the investigation, the government's representative is to draw up his brief of the case, and he is to sign it and send it to the chairman of the Council along with the complete file. He is to do so within 15 days of the date of receiving the file. The chairman of the Council may extend this period for compelling circumstances.

The brief must include an account of the violation committed by the indicted officer; a determination of the evidence, the corroborating facts and the legal stipulations upon which they are based; and suggestions that he deems suitable.

The indicted officer or his representative has the right to examine all the documents pertaining to the case and to copy whatever he deems necessary for the defense with the exception of those papers which assume the form of national defense secrets.

Section Six: The Basic Rules of Trial Before the Council

Article Twenty-One: The indicted officer is to be notified at least 3 days before the trial of the specific place and time of his hearing in front of the Council. He is to be notified in accordance with the basic rules outlined in the Military Justice Law.

If the indicted officer fails to appear in front of the Council at the hearing without a legitimate excuse, in spite of the fact that he was duly notified of the time of the hearing, this fact is to be stated in the proceedings, and the Council is to continue hearing the case without the absent officer. The case is to be considered uncontested.

Article Twenty-Two: The chairman of the Council is to summon the Council members to a meeting within a week of receiving the file from the government representative.

Article Twenty-Three: The chairman presides over the [sessions of the] Council; he conducts its meetings, its discussions and the trial sessions.

Article Twenty-Four: The Council may hear the testimony of the indicted officer, of his representative and of witnesses and experts. If any one of the witnesses fails to appear, hearing his testimony may be dispensed with. Such dispensation is to be recorded in the report. The Council is to determine and to disburse to the experts and witnesses, who are not employees and civil servants, an allowance to cover their efforts and their transportation costs. These disbursements are to be made from the appropriations allocated for this purpose in the budget of the Ministry of National Defense.

Article Twenty-Five: Only the testimony of legally competent people is acceptable. The Council may in any case hear the testimony of those who are not legally competent for the purpose of gaining information.

Article Twenty-Six: After the Council completes the trial, the government's representative is to deliver a verbal or a written brief. The Council then asks the indicted officer or his representative for a final statement. The officer's representative has the right to request an interim period for the defense, and the Council, at its own discretion, makes a determination on this request.

If the representative does not request a delay, the Council is to hear his defense and to let the indicted officer make a final statement. The chairman of the Council then announces the conclusion of the trial.

Article Twenty-Seven: The sessions of the Council are confidential. They are not considered legal unless they are completed and are attended by the government's representative.

Article Twenty-Eight: After the conclusion of the trial, the chairman of the Council orders the immediate review of the case which continues without interruption until a decision is rendered, unless this is prevented by a material, compelling impediment that makes postponement necessary. Postponement is determined at the discretion of the Council.

Section Four: The Conclusion of the Trial

Article Twenty-Nine: The Council issues unanimous or majority decisions with reasons therefor. These decisions are signed by the full body of the Council, and any dissenting member is to record his dissenting [opinion].

Article Thirty: The indicted officer or his representative is to be notified of the decision in accordance with the basic rules determined in the Military Justice Code. The decision is to be presented to the minister of national defense within 24 hours after it is issued.

Article Thirty-One: The decisions of the Council are judicial in nature and may be appealed to a Military Court of Cassation within 15 days of the notification date.

The decisions of the Council remain confidential.

Article Thirty-Two: If the decision issued by the Council is not appealed within the period specified in Article 31 above, the principal organization with which the officer is affiliated is to take the necessary measures to implement the decision.

Article Thirty-Three: This statute is to be published and is to be reported wherever necessary. It becomes effective upon publication in the Official Gazette.

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LEBANON

PROMOTIONS OF NON-NATIONALIST OFFICERS CRITICIZED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 9 Jan 80 p 4

[Article: "Ahmad al-Khatib Says, 'Nationalist Officers Were Excluded from Recent Promotions'"]

[Text] In a statement he gave to the Pres. News Agency the commander of Lebanon's Arab Army said, "Nationalist officers were excluded from all promotions; their salaries were discontinued; and, contrary to the resolutions of the Bayt al-Din [conference], they were turned over to military court." He said that the government had dealt with Sa'd Haddad and with the officers who are still working under his command. Some of them were included in the recent promotions as a challenge to the feelings of citizens. This was done under pressure from the separatist front for the purpose of promoting some symbolic figures that had emerged during the events, such as Maj Fu'ad Malik who established an illegal army and Maj Francois Zayn, who committed the Salima massacre.

Al-Khatib thought that the government "found that placing the names of some officers in the Arab Army of Lebanon on the promotions roster was inescapable even though it was certain that the officers of the Arab Army of Lebanon who were maintaining their nationalist position would not return to the governmental fold. In the past they had refused all the government's proposals because they knew that its goal was clear: to liquidate the Arab Army of Lebanon administratively and politically after it had failed to liquidate it militarily. The fact that they let the names of 'Umar 'Abdallah and Bassam al-Adalbi go through [the roster] was only a balanced cover-up so they can push through [the names] of many officers who had turned their backs on the law and on human values. In the past they had pushed through the names of others in the national rank and file for the purpose of pushing through an array of names, like al-Tahhan and others, belonging to those who had fought among the ranks of the separatists."

Regarding his opinion on the fact that the Lebanese army was widespread and that it had entered South Lebanon, he said this plan was "one in a series of plans to subject all Lebanese territory to the laws of a group so as to have this followed by the participation of Lebanon in the Camp

David talks. This is what the evidence indicates: beyond Sa'd Haddad and his ties with the government; beyond the equivocation regarding Haddad's dealing with the Israeli enemy; and beyond the warm relations that exist between the separatist front, which has ties with the Israeli enemy and the government."

Al-Khatib criticized the government's position vis a vis the Iranian Revolution and the fact that it prevented al-Shaykh Muhammad Muntazarri from holding a press conference in al-Hamra'. [He also criticized the government] for preventing the representative of Imam Khomeyni, Mr Mahdi Amirkamali from delivering his lecture at the Iranian Embassy. He said, "I felt it was my national duty to lead a force of the Arab Army of Lebanon and to break the cordon that had been imposed by the government on the building of the Iranian Embassy. I had to guarantee the suitable environment for convening this conference. I was careful that there be no injuries among the government's men because I was certain that there were helpless nationalist elements among them who were forced to carry out orders out of concern for their own livelihood and the livelihood of their children."

8592
CSO: 4802

MAURITANIA

NATIONS SUFFERING FROM AFTER-EFFECTS OF SAHARAN WAR

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 28 Jan 80 pp 40-41

[Article by Zeini Moulaye: "'Positive Neutralism' in Nouakchott ; From Political Stability to Economic Recovery "]

[Text] "Positive neutralism" will dictate the Mauritanian government's foreign policy from now on. At least that is what is evident from the statements of Lt Dahane Ould Ahmed Mahmoud, spokesman of the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN). This new orientation has recently begun to be illustrated by a broad diplomatic overture towards what is called in Nouakchott the "fraternal and friendly countries." With its neighbors to the south, the government has entered into closer cooperation for the joint implementation of economic projects as part of the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS). To the north, a close rapprochement is taking form with Algeria and the POLISARIO Front. On the other hand, Nouakchott is keeping its distance with regard to Morocco, while declaring itself prepared for a "sound" cooperation. The Mauritanian authorities seem convinced that they have a "role to play" in the future. They have set now for themselves the goal of "working without reservation for a united Arab nation, for a truly de-colonized Africa and for Arab-African cooperation."

These words give indication of the "new orientations" of a government which has consolidated its bases and strengthened its cohesiveness after the "palace coup" of 4 January: Lt Col Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Louly thus had to give up his position as chief of state to Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, who had up to then been the Prime Minister. Following this event, a new constitutional charter, putting an end to two-man rule, was adopted during a lengthy 10-day session of the CMSN.

Besides the promulgation of this charter, the last session of the CMSN produced some notable changes. First, within the very bosom of the supreme governing body, three members of the permanent committee were ousted: Lt Col Ahmed Salem Ould Sidy, then the second vice president of the CMSN; Maj Thiam El-Hadj, minister of youth and sports; and Lt Col Cheikh Ould Boyde, state comptroller general and former commander of the police.

Within the reshuffled government, the key positions of foreign and domestic affairs were entrusted respectively to Mohamed Mokhtar Ould Zamel and Maj Moulaye Ould Boukhreiss, who were considered to be "very close" politically to the chief of state and "in favor of" a rapprochement with Algeria. Four ministers made their entrance into the government: Soumare Oumar (fishing and sea economy); Sissoko Mamadou (industry, mining and trade); Mohamed Ould Amar (rural development); and Ahmedou Ould Sidi Hanena (information, culture, the postal services and telecommunications).

It is still too early to come to a conclusion concerning the significance of these changes. But if one believes some sources, the members of the CMSN who were ousted were reportedly "pro-Moroccan," which should permit Algiers POLISARIO Front to obtain some advantage vis-a-vis Rabat in the regional balance of power that currently prevails. At all events, official sources indicate that the changes which occurred at the summit of the Mauritanian state had the aim of "getting rid of all those who are not working with commitment and determination for national recovery." This recovery, which should affect the economic, financial, administrative, institutional and political sectors, seems to be the main concern of the new government.

How, however, can Mauritania go through so uncomfortable a situation when it is known that a conflict in which it had only recently been a participant is been continuing on its borders for the past 5 years? "Mauritania has been out of the war once and for all, and wants to preserve a strict neutrality in the Saharan conflict," a reliable source points out. But does the country really have the means of abiding by this "strict neutrality?" "Yes," they tell us. "Its means are its political will and the understanding of its friends."

Its political will was shown when it signed a "permanent peace agreement" with the POLISARIO Front on 5 August, 1979, while it was still thought to be in Morocco's fold. In early December, 1979, it also reestablished diplomatic ties with Algeria and sought the evacuation of the Moroccan troops which were stationed in Bir-Mogreim. But, in declaring its neutrality, will Mauritania be able, in spite of everything, to remain indifferent to the way the Western Sahara conflict develops?

Everything indicates that it will have trouble maintaining this position. First, it remains present in Guera, a city at the southernmost part of the Western Sahara, only 2 km from Nouadhibou where the most important achievements of the Islamic Republic are found. Next, it is tightening its ties with Algeria, whose cooperation it wished in the implementation of some economic projects. The war in the Western Sahara, in which Mokhtar Ould Daddad had played, tolled the knell of an economy already disrupted by the world market and especially by the drought which struck the Sahel from 1968 to 1974. At present, the food problem remains preoccupying in Mauritania. The food shortage exceeds 800,000 tons, while the financial deficit is around 3.4

billion ouguiya.* The foreign debt amounted last March to more than \$750 million (or 150 percent of the GNP), while revenues totaled only 50 percent of expenditures.**

Faced with this situation, which could not be more catastrophic, the government decided to take emergency financial measures. In particular, it had to reduce military spending by demobilizing two-thirds of the army's manpower. As for industrial matters, last 24 December, the government signed three agreements with the UN Development Program (UNDP). The first dealt with the establishment of a National Center for Industrial Information which will permit planning to be improved and the establishment of new firms to be stimulated; the second concerned the development of building materials industries, and included a study of markets (regional and local) as well as a series of other studies on setting up units for producing building materials; the third agreement had to do with the industrial uses of black sand on the Atlantic coast. This project involves the establishment of a concentration industry producing concentrations of heavy ores suitable for export. A team of consultants from the Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is in charge of evaluating the volume of these deposits and their economic profitability. The UNDP's contribution to each of these programs is \$100,800 for the first; \$90,000 for the second; and \$66,800 for the third.

Last 11 December, the European Investment Bank [EIB] granted Mauritania a loan of 25 million units of account (or 146.25 million French francs) as part of the first Lome convention. This loan should aid in the working of iron ore deposits in Guelbs-El-Rhein, in the Zouerate area. It will be granted to the National Industry and Mining Company (SNIM) for a period of 15 years and at an interest rate of 7.4 percent. The opening of the mine is scheduled for 1983. It contains 285 million tons of iron ore.

The government is to develop the ore of the Guelbs project. To do this, it has made application to many money lenders. Besides the Mauritanian state and the SNIM shareholders, the World Bank; the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation [CCCE] (150 million French francs); the African Development Bank [ADB]; the OPEC fund (\$5 million); the Japanese Government; the Saudi Development Fund (\$65 million); the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (\$50 million); the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund (\$35 million); and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (\$20 million), took part in financing the project.

In the area of fishing, a new policy was rather recently initiated. It aims in particular to provide for the processing and marketing of fish products from Mauritanian ports. That will possibly permit foreign exchange holdings to increase and the balance of payments, presently showing a deficit, to be stabilized.

* 1 ouguiya = 0.5 French francs.

** LE MONDE 9 January 1980.

*** MARCHES TROPICAUX 4 January 1980.

As for the rest, since the reopening last 7 December of the Algerian Embassy in Nouakchott, there has been a new diplomatic movement pointing to a rapprochement with Algeria. Thus, in December, Mohamed Mokhtar Ould Zamel made a stay that attracted attention in Algiers, after which a delegation of Algerian oil experts arrived in Nouakchott to study the possibilities of cooperation with Algeria in getting the Nouadhibou refinery started. When they had this refinery built 3 years ago by an Austrian firm, the Mauritanian authorities thought they could export refined oil, especially to neighboring countries, since domestic consumption then was only 350,000 tons, while the capacity of the refining unit was 1 million tons per year. Algeria, with whom Nouakchott then had excellent relations, was to supply the oil. But, the Western Sahara affair and its consequences, particularly the breaking off of diplomatic relations in 1976, prevented the project from being carried out. Indications are that the recent wish of the Nouakchott authorities to have the refinery get underway will be granted by Algiers. But, even if we assume political stability and the cooperation of certain "friendly" countries, it will be difficult to straighten out the economic situation before 3 to 5 years.

Lastly, at the social level, a certain calm is noted at this time. The linguistic reform adopted in December appears to have satisfied the parties opposing each other. The establishment over a 5-year period of an institute for national languages was provided for, as well as the development of the Pular, Wolof and Soninke languages, which will gradually be introduced into education. Meanwhile, the process of Arabization will continue on a regular basis, and a bilingual section will become part of the institutions beginning with the next school year.

There is one thing left to consider: Mauritania is suffering from the effects of the war. The government seems to realize this and to want at all costs to extricate the country from political instability and economic stagnation. It has the will to do so, but it does not yet have the material means. The recent agreements and a forceful diplomacy will possibly permit it to acquire them.

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4400

BCM GOVERNOR DISCUSSES NEW BANKING POLICY

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 19-20 Jan 80 p 3

[Article: "The Governor of the BCMs 'Adopt a Very Wise Credit Policy'"]

[Text] Mr Dieng Boubou Farba, governor of the Central Bank of Mauritania [BCM], has revealed, in an exclusive interview with Radio-Mauritanien, that his institution this year will adopt a very wise credit policy, both in the private and in the state sector of the economy. This will naturally be done with the major concern of maintaining external receipts at a level sufficient to permit the regular procurement of provisions for the country.

Mr Dieng Boubou Farba, asked to provide a diagnosis of the condition of the economy of the country as of the beginning of 1980, recalled that the economic and financial situation is in a quite worrying state and that it is now urgent to realize that this situation is going to require an unprecedented effort to clean it up.

He said that the Central Bank of Mauritania could not, by itself, remedy this situation. However, it will assist the Government by putting at its disposal all the possibilities which monetary policy offer, within the framework sketched out by the Military Committee of National Salvation.

To the question whether our foreign exchange reserves permit facing up to our external commitments, Mr Dieng Boubou Farba stated that our external reserves amount to 5.6 billion ouguiya. This corresponds, on the average, to six months of imports. This is a satisfactory situation, he said.

Responding to the question as to how the balance of payments and the trade balance stand, the governor of the Central Bank of Mauritania said the following. The trade balance, which has undergone some difficulty since the years 1976-77, nevertheless reflects some improvement in 1979, improvement made possible, thanks to the resumption of exports by the SNIM [National Industrial and Mining Company] (which have reached their normal level) and also thanks to the reduction of imports as a consequence of a basic credit policy which, while it has been measured, has not involved a short-

age of products of basic necessity in the market.

With regard to the balance of payments the governor of the Central Bank of Mauritania, referring to indications available for the first 11 months of 1979, said that this balance will be in slight deficit, certainly less important than during previous years.

"The imbalance exists," he added, "and it is important that measures be taken at all levels to bring it back to proper proportions."

And the ouguiya? It is getting along well, the governor said, because first of all on the external side the provisioning of the country is taking place normally and there is no contingency and still less a shortage which could engender and develop the black market on the internal scene. The money supply is under control, the level of credits is definite, taking account of the differing economic factors, and remains within reasonable proportions.

Asked to state the measures which the Central Bank would be led to take to apply the recommendation of the Military Committee of National Salvation concerning the placing in effect of a system of selection regarding the level of imports, Mr Dieng Boubou Farba said that the measures of selection recommended by the Military Committee of National Salvation have reached the points indicated, since they will permit economy in the use of foreign exchange and internal savings.

Won't the system of selection risk shackling free enterprise and engendering poverty?

Absolutely not, responded Mr Dieng Boubou Farba, who states that any economic operator who fulfills certain conditions can import goods, can exercise the commercial function, and he does not see his operations limited or blocked in any way.

Luxury vehicles and certain categories of textiles are not included in what one generally calls provisioning the country, Mr Dieng Boubou Farba stated.

In reply to a question whether there is not great firmness in the BCM in the credit field Mr Dieng Boubou Farba replied that what there is involves an objective appreciation of the situation of enterprises which wish to obtain credits.

Asked if there is a new banking policy, he replied, "Yes, there is a new banking policy, which accords priority to the rural world. And this is why," Mr Dieng Boubou Farba declared, "there is envisaged the creation of a national development fund which would cover, beyond the rural sector, the real estate and industrial sectors."

Thus, in the area of the rural sector there will be undertaken detailed studies to put in place a system of agricultural credit.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

PDRY PARTY DELEGATION LEAVES FOR ETHIOPIA

LD041628 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 4 Mar 80 LD/EA

[Except] Brother 'Ali Salim al-Bid, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] Central Committee, left Aden at noon today for Addis Ababa on an official visit to the friendly Socialist Republic of Ethiopia at the head of a party delegation which includes brother Salih Hasan Muhammad, member of the Central Committee and principal of the Higher School for Scientific Socialism.

Shortly before his departure, brother 'Ali Salim al-Bid told the ADEN NEWS AGENCY that his visit and that of the party delegation was at the invitation of the Ethiopian Workers' Party. He said he had a verbal message from brother 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council, to comrade Lt Col Mengistu Haile Mariam, chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Ethiopia.

Brother al-Bid added that during the visit he would hold talks with officials of the Ethiopian Workers' Party centering on bilateral party relations between the two friendly countries and methods of them further. He further said that brother Salih Hasan Muhammad, member of the Political Bureau and principal of the Higher School for Scientific Socialism, would also hold talks with his counterpart, the principal of the Higher School of Scientific Socialism in Ethiopia, and would touch on coordination in the field of qualifying party cadres, exchange of experiences and the coordination of cooperation among them.

CSO: 4802

LONDON SAUDI PAPER ON U.S. BACKDOWN FROM VOTE ON UN RESOLUTION

LD061621 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 5 Mar 80 p 5 LD

[Article by 'Irfan Nizam al-Din: "Why Has Carter Backtracked?"]

[Excerpts] The war of "finger biting" between Carter's administration and Menahem Begin's administration has now entered a critical stage and everybody is waiting to see who will scream first.

This war goes back to the first day of Carter's presidency in which each party used its own special weapons. Israel has resorted to pressure, blackmail, threats and manipulating opponents. For his part Carter used his expertise as a state governor and a peanut merchant. He would make an offer and then withdraw it; he would make a demand, deal a blow and be prepared to receive two blows; he would advance two steps and go back one step, thus winning a step every time he advances.

What happened following the U.S. vote on the Security Council resolution condemning Israel falls within these tactics. Legally, an official stand has been placed on record which cannot be erased from the UN records. Politically, Carter can say whatever he likes because statements are one thing but legal endorsement is another.

The statement issued by the White House, if we look upon it impartially, can only be described as "ridiculous" for nobody would believe that a major power has erred in understanding the resolution or that, in the era of modern technology, failed to send the proper instructions to its UN Ambassador Donald McHenry, or that the mistake was the result of sending him erroneous instructions. Moreover, objection to the call to dismantle the settlements and to the clause of Jerusalem is tantamount to a defiance of international charters and laws and of the rights of the original owners of the land.

If we look upon the matter from the angle of "local consumption" and in the light of the tug of war between Carter and Israel, the White House statement cannot have any legal effect and can only be one of the signs of fear of the Zionist lobby and a sign of blatant Israeli interference in U.S. policy.

The strange thing is that Israel makes no bones about such interference. Indeed, its Ambassador Efrayim 'Evron met with Vice President Walter Mondale, who is known for his pro-Zionist inclinations, and asked him to bring pressure to bear on Carter. Also, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had clearly called for "the mobilization of all the friends of Israel in the United States in order to exploit the election situation."

Therefore, the battle atmosphere has become hotter but the results depend on Carter's ability to stand fast and to continue to win rounds without heeding the votes of Jews who did not vote for him in the first place and who will not vote for him in the November elections--even if he should finally retreat and show repentance after his admission of error--because Israel had no confidence in him from the outset.

It is no exaggeration to say that many things depend on the outcome of the current conflict whether Carter appeases Israel or confronts it or whether he wins the election or loses it.

CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

LONDON SAUDI PAPER SCOFFS AT RUMORS OF DISTURBANCES IN SAUDI ARABIA

LD030935 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 29 Feb 80 p 5 LD

[Article by Jihad al-Khazin: "A Precise Measure of Firmness"]

[Excerpts] The spreading of rumors about disturbances occurring in the Saudi Arabian kingdom at a time when a strong wave of anger was sweeping the Arab world over the exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel was not a coincidence at all.

Once again the Saudi Government was compelled to deny (this time through its Minister of Information Dr Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani) the existence of any disturbances. Meanwhile, Saudi citizens have seen King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz receiving visitors in the hospital where he is now recovering from an indisposition.

Taking first things first and discussing the matter calmly and with a sense of responsibility, we would note that the rumors about disturbances in Saudi Arabia or the outbreak of differences among the brother princes started only after President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the U.S. involvement with Egypt and Israel as a third party in the subsequent negotiations that led to the Camp David agreement and the peace treaty.

Since that ill-omened visit, during and after the Camp David negotiations and up to the exchange of ambassadors this week the Saudi Arabian Kingdom stood against and concemed the whole process. It did not do so out of love for war but out of its belief that the agreements concluded do not achieve for the Arabs their legitimate aspirations, particularly with regard to Palestinian autonomy as a first step toward the establishment of a independent Palestinian state.

Those who at the beginning believed that Saudi Arabia's opposition was mere words and that the Saudi Government would sooner or later fall into line with Egypt and the United States soon found out that the Saudi opposition was not only real but also a safeguard and a support for rejection. The

truth of the matter is that had Saudi Arabia adopted a different stand the whole situation would have changed and President al-Sadat would not have suffered from isolation, nor would the Palestinians and others have been able to stand fast.

Therefore, the unleashing of rumors against the Saudi regime and its stability increases in proportion to the importance of the sincere national role the Saudi Arabian Kingdom is playing in the area.

I was in my office yesterday when the manager of an Arab bank in London contacted me to say that the bank's branch in Zurich had just contacted him and told him that the gold market in Zurich was "shaken" because of rumors of disturbances in Saudi Arabia.

I assured the bank manager that a short while before I had been in regular phone contact with the head of the newspaper's Riyadh office and a few minutes earlier with the newspaper publisher Hisham Hafiz in Jidda and that there were no grounds for the Zurich rumors which had been transmitted to the London market.

The Arab bank manager said that he suspects that some gold speculators and independent crude oil merchants are behind the rumor because any incident in Saudi Arabia is bound to shake the world's economic structure in view of the importance of Saudi oil.

If the bank manager's words are true--and he definitely knows what he is saying--then this means that the parties hostile to the Saudi nationalist policy, either by coincidence or by previous arrangement, have joined hands with black market merchants in spreading rumors about Saudi Arabia.

Thus the Arabs find themselves in a position where they fear that the rumors might stop, because their continuation is the most precise measure of the growing capability of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom's economy and of its continuation of its true nationalist line that satisfies all the Arabs.

The losers, of course, are not the Saudi regime, nor the Saudi people nor the other Arabs, but those who believe rumors and buy oil and gold in order to sell it or hoard it and also those who have unleashed the rumors, which have backfired on them.

CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

SAUDIS SEEK JAPANESE CONCESSIONS ON PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT

OW030325 Tokyo KYODO in English 0306 GMT 3 Mar 80 OW

[Text] Riyadh, 2 Mar KYODO--Saudi Arabia asked Japan Sunday to make concessions on terms of promoting a joint project to build a petrochemical plant in al-Jubayl on the Persian Gulf. The request was made by Saudi Minister of Planning Shaykh Hisham Nazir when he met with Japanese special envoy Sunao Sonoda.

During the 40-minute conference, Nazir said the Japanese concessions on conditions and terms for pushing the project are imperative for early conclusion of an interim agreement with Japan's Mitsubishi business group. Specifically, Nazir said, Saudi Arabia wants the project to be subject to application of Saudi laws. The Japanese side should also compromise on such matters as how the two nations should share products at the plant when its annual ethylene production is expanded to 450,000 tons from the initially-projected 300,000 tons in the future, he said.

The Mitsubishi group has been promoting the project in a joint venture with Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corp(SABIC). The plant was originally designed to produce 300,000 tons of ethylene a year but the two sides agreed to expand the annual output to 450,000 tons when former Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry Masumi Esaki visited Saudi Arabia last July. Under a basic agreement between the Mitsubishi group and the Saudi state-run company, the plant is to be put into operation in 1985.

The Mitsubishi group and SABIC are scheduled to hold final negotiations here Saturday for conclusion of an interim agreement for the establishment of a joint company to study the feasibility of the project.

Sonoda stopped short of making a clearcut commitment regarding the Saudi request for Japanese concessions on terms for promotion of the project. He only stated that he hopes the interim agreement to be concluded when Nazir visits Japan toward the end of this month.

CSO: 4820

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

U.S. PRESSURES ON OIL PRODUCTION--Beirut, 2 Mar (AFP)--Saudi Oil Minister Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani could lose his authority for supporting U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia to maintain its current level of oil production, the Lebanese leftist daily AL-SAFIR reported here today. Quoting sources at the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the paper said in a report from London that Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal, who favours reducing output as do most other OPEC countries, could take over responsibility for oil temporarily. The paper said the current visit to Saudi Arabia by U.S. Energy Secretary Charles Duncan was aimed at persuading Saudi leaders to maintain oil output at 9.5 million barrels a day throughout the 1980's. The report added that several Saudi leaders would like to cut output to 8.5 million barrels a day from the beginning of April. [Text] [NC021141 Paris AFP in English 1127 GMT 2 Mar 80 NC]

CSO: 4820

TUNISIA

'LE MONDE' VIEWS 'UNCERTAIN' SITUATION IN TUNISIA

LD071225 Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Mar 80 p 1 LD

[Editorial: "Uncertainties in Tunisia"]

[Text] A certain nervousness reigns in Tunisia. It is caused mainly by the population's doubts about the future. Whatever Libya's responsibility in the Gafsa attack may have been, the affair confirmed the unease which has existed in part of the country since the 26 January 1978 riots. The cerebral hemorrhage suffered by [Prime Minister] Hedi Nouira has added to the anxiety. Despite the reassuring nature of the last health bulletin, this attack is likely to prevent the prime minister from resuming the duties he has been fulfilling for 10 years.

His admission to the hospital highlights the political vacuum against which the regime had tried to guard by maintaining a strong and inflexible man at its head.

Of course, in accordance with the presidential regime in force, [President] Bourguiba still effectively directs the country's policy, which the government is responsible for implementing. However, he is not immune from a relapse and has to take care of himself. He has therefore appointed [National Education Minister] Mohamed Mzali "coordinator" of government activity.

Although--while awaiting the appointment of a temporary or even a permanent prime minister--the normal execution of public affairs has been insured, Mr Nouira's absence nonetheless makes the regimes' internal position more uncertain since, under the terms of the constitution, it is the prime minister in office who automatically succeeds the head of state should the post fall vacant. Mr Nouira's probable exit from the political scene follows those sparked off by the numerous purges of the past 10 years: Ahmed Ben Salah in 1969, Bahi Ladgham in 1970, Ahmed Mestiri in 1971, Mohamed Masmoudi in 1974, Tahar Belkhodja in 1977 and Abdallah Farhat in 1979. This elimination of the country's leading political figures as a result either of factional struggles or the government's stalling with regard to

an open approach, constantly proclaimed but always postponed, now makes the choice of the "successor-designate" more difficult.

The government and the Destourian Socialist Party [PSD] Politburo are now overwhelmingly composed of technocrats and senior civil servants. Aside from Mr. Hédi, PSD Director Mohamed Sayah is the only politician still in office. Even he emerged in a weaker position from the last party congress following the factional struggle which placed him in opposition to Mr. Nouira's team, and he was only kept in office on President Bourguiba's intervention. Since his job leads him to apply unpopular decisions that were taken collectively, he has often served as a scapegoat and is therefore criticized by all opposition groups, which accuse him of authoritarian methods.

This situation is further complicated by not very bright economic prospects: the stagnation of agriculture aggravated by a persistent drought, weakness of industrial development and repercussions of the world crisis. The social climate is still tense as a result of the 1978 events and the fact that most of the trade union leadership members are still in prison. Finally, on the external plane, Algeria's barely disguised distrust is added to Libya's open and active hostility. Tunisia's traditional friends have good reason to ask questions. Moreover, on his return to Paris, Mr Giscard d'Estaing will find a personal letter from Mr Bourguiba.

The president, who will be 77 in August, will have to draw on his long experience to find ways of setting the country back on course. Will he open the door to moderate opposition groups which have remained legal, as he seemed to intend by opening a dialog with his former defense minister, Mestiri? Should he go even further than that?

File: 4400

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

FAVORABLE BALANCE OF TRADE MAINTAINED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 23 Feb 80 pp 3-6

[Text] Under a system of freewheeling and mercantilism, where the laws of supply and demand remain unbridled, the Government of the UAE observes no restrictions on exports and levies no duties on imports. Importers are never required to seek import permits, nor are they forced to limit the quantities of their commodities or be shackled by stringent monetary regulations that often impede commercial activities under guided economies.

Local markets are left to carve their own courses, with the State keeping a close tab to crystallise favourable trends and eliminate undesirable phenomena, if any. Nominal import taxes, not exceeding 3 percent, are levied. Basic commodities imported for local consumption are totally tax free. The country's foreign trade balance showed heartening results during the past five years largely on account of the government's policy.

Crude oil remains the dominant export, accounting for 88 percent of the country's total exported products, according to official statistics issued in January and covering the five year period ending in December 1978.

Revenues from oil sales are the main source for import financing. Imports include consumer commodities as well as materials necessary for the local economic development programmes.

Understandably, imports go partially into consumption and mainly into industrial, agricultural and services sectors. Small sums also come from the export of dates, fish, animal leather, cast iron, semi-finished products and mineral waters--all accounting for about 10 percent of the country's export total.

Unregistered exports, bought in local markets and carried home by travellers are not accounted for, because no statistics are available on that score. This according to independent estimates, may total nearly 0.5 percent of the export total.

During the 1973-78 period, imports have been on the rise, reflecting the growing needs of a constantly developing economy. These imports have been eating away at the enormous income from oil sales, notwithstanding the marked hikes in crude oil prices and the great boost in state revenues. However, officials are gratified by the fact that industrial imports will, in the long run, generate indigenous products and pay back handsome dividends.

The three main emirates, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah together account for crude oil exports of the order Dh 33,719 million (1978). Of this Abu Dhabi had a share of Dh 6,587 million, 19.5 percent of the total. Dubai's share was Dh 6,587 million, 19 percent of the total and Sharjah's 413.2 million. [as printed]

In 1977, the country's oil exports brought in a total of Dh 35 billion because Abu Dhabi had cut back its production by 16 percent--Abu Dhabi's Marine Areas (ADMA) and the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company's production dropped from a total of 596 million barrels in 1977 to 521 million in 1978. That meant a decline of 4 billion Dirhams--from Dh 30 billion to Dh 26 billion.

But revenues from natural gas sales were Dh 512 million in 1978 compared with Dh 130 million in 1977. In Dubai revenues from oil exports registered an increase in 1978, however. The emirate had increased its production rate by 17.5 percent during that year--from 114 million barrels in 1977 to 134 million barrels in 1978, with a rise in income from Dirhams 4,425 million to Dh 6,587 million.

In Sharjah, oil revenues dropped from Dirhams 859.1 million in 1977 to Dh 413.1 million in 1978, a good 51.9 percent decline. No reason was given for this sharp drop however.

The drop in income during 1978 did not adversely affect the overall balance of trade for the UAE which boasted a trade surplus of Dh 17.4 billion. Officials said the surplus was largely due to the fact that the total imports during 1978 did not exceed that of the preceding year.

The industrialised countries of Western Europe were the main importers of crude oil from the UAE during 1978, accounting for 41.4 percent of the UAE's total exports. This poured a total of Dh 13,962 million into the Treasury during that year, according to official figures.

If these states France ranked highest on the list of oil importers from the Federation receiving a total of Dh 4.7 billion worth of crude oil. Holland was the second largest importer, paying Dh 2.5 billion, Spain paid Dh 1.8 billion, Britain Dh 1.7 billion, which was way below its imports in 1977 when it paid Dh 2.1 billion.

The Asian countries imported Dh 10.6 billion worth of crude oil from the UAE during 1978. This accounted for 31.5 percent of the country's total exports. Japan topped the list of Asian importers of UAE crude during that year paying Dirhams 9.1 billion. It also was the largest importer of UAE crude in the world during the same year, with about 27 percent of the federation's crude oil exports going to it.

The North American states foremost among them the United States were the third largest group of importers of UAE crude during 1978, accounting for 12 percent of the federation total exports. Official reports showed that US imports of UAE crude oil had dropped 34.4 percent during 1978 from Dh 6.1 billion in 1978 to four billion dirhams.

The Latin American countries also imported about 12 percent of the UAE's crude oil exports during 1978. Arab oil have not countries imported a mere 1 percent of the UAE's oil during the same year. [as printed]

Egypt was among these Arab importers when its Sinai oilfields were still in Israeli hands. In addition African countries imported 1.6 percent of the country's oil during the same year.

Exports of local products other than oil and re-export of locally treated imports normally go to the neighbouring Gulf states and the rest of the world through the ports of the emirate of Dubai. These non-oil exports and re-exports amount to 1,786.1 million Dh during 1978, a 22.3 rise over the 1977 figures.

Processed products amounted to Dh 387.6 million of the re-exports, a 21.7 percent of the total. Other miscellaneous processed products re-exports from the UAE amounted to Dh 339.8 million during that year, 19 percent of the total.

Food commodities re-exported to neighbouring countries amounted to Dh 313 million during 1978, beverages and tobacco to 98.6 million and 64.4 million of materials not including fuel.

Chemical products came last on the list of re-exports, accounting for Dh 47.1 million during the year, according to government statistics. Iran was the main importer of re-exported materials from the UAE during 1978, accounting for a total of Dh 575 million, or 32 percent of the country's re-export total. In that category of re-exports recipients Saudi Arabia ranked second with Dh 447.4 million, or 25 percent of the total during the year.

The State of Qatar imported UAE re-exports totalling Dirhams 248.5 million, or 13.9 percent of the total. The rest of the re-exports (Dh 219 million) went to North Yemen, 12.3 percent of the total.

Non-oil exports during 1978 amounted to Dh 8.3 million or 0.5 percent of the total exports and re-exports outside the oil sector. Food exports alone brought in Dh 905,000 of which Dh 303,000 were payments for fish shipments and 502,000 for date exports. Raw material exports excluding fuel amounted to Dh 7.4 million. These exports comprised mainly shipments of cast iron.

Fourteen countries are receiving these non-oil exports of the UAE foremost among them Pakistan, which imported Dh 6.6 million worth of cast iron. Then comes Iran which imported Dh 722,600 worth of the same commodity, in addition to Dh 81,400 of dried fish.

Somalia is the third largest importer of non-oil exports from the UAE receiving Dh 329,000 worth of dates.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

FIRST MAJOR GAS FIND IN SHARJAH REPORTED

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 11 Feb 80 p 12

[Text] Sharjah, one of the seven Emirates making up the UAE, has made its first major gas find, it was announced last week. Officials at the Emirate's Petroleum Department said that preliminary tests indicated that output capacity from the offshore well was about 15 million cubic feet per day.

This is a considerable quantity; in 1978, the UAE as a whole produced a total of 478,632 million cubic feet, most of it from onshore and offshore fields in Abu Dhabi. The Abu Dhabi Petroleum Co produced more than half, 259,188 million cubic feet, equivalent to about 680 million cubic feet per day, while Abu Dhabi Marine Areas, operating offshore, yielded about 580 million cubic feet per day.

Drilling and laboratory work on the new Sharjah well was carried out by the US Foreman Company and London Sketch Marine Oil Exploration Company. The officials said "there is great possibility of finding oil as well as gas."

Drilling took 90 days and laboratory tests a further two weeks, they said.

An official quoted by the official UAE news agency said that the government would set up plants to extract methane from the gas that had been discovered to operate local electric and water stations during subsequent exploration and drilling work.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

GAS PRICE INCREASES--The UAE has raised the price of its liquified petroleum gas by 7 percent, backdated to January 1. Petroleum Minister Mana Sayeed al-Oteiba last week said that the new price was \$5.39 per million British Thermal Units, compared with the previous price, \$5.04. The price of the UAE's LPG has increased by 113 percent in less than two months. In December, it was raised from \$2.36 to \$4 per million BTUs, and Mr Oteiba said it would rise in parallel with increases in the price of the country's Murban crude. Earlier this month, the UAE increased the price of its crude by \$2 to \$29.6 a barrel, 37 percent above its mid-December price of \$21.56. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 11 Feb 80 p 12]

OLE PRODUCT SUBSIDIZATION--The UAE News Agency announced yesterday that the President of UAE, Sheikh Zayed Ben Sultan Al-Nahyan, has allocated 200 million dirhams (about 53 million dollars) to decrease the prices of oil products in most of the 7 emirates of the UAE. The agency said that the oil products whose prices were decreased, would be sold to the citizens of the Northern Emirates only. The Agency did not specify what was meant by "Northern Emirates only." However, observers interpreted that the foreigners would have to buy at the increased prices of the foreign oil companies. The decision of Sheikh Zayed came as a result of a series of student manifestations in the different regions affected by the increase. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 23 Feb 80 p 8]

BANGLADESH SEEKS CRUDE--Energy talks between UAE and Bangladesh were held in Abu Dhabi last week. After the meeting, the UAE Oil Minister Sheikh Mana Said Al Otaiba said the talks dealt with problems of cooperation in the field of petroleum and the extent to which the UAE could provide Bangladesh with financial assistance for development. Otaiba added that an economic and technical delegation would visit Bangladesh to examine the possibilities of economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. Otaiba further added that Bangladesh had requested more oil supplies from the UAE. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 23 Feb 80 p 9]

ANTI-OIL PRICE INCREASE RIOTS--Student demonstrations took place in Ajman and Sharjah in the UAE last week against the rise of prices at gas stations. The thirty percent increase has brought up the cost of one gallon of gasoline from Dh 4 to 5.30 dirhams. Sheikh Hamed bin Rashed al Nuhami, Vice Governor of Ajman stated that he agreed with the students' demands that the national oil companies distribute gasoline in all the UAE emirates instead of the foreign oil distributors. In Abu Dhabi the national Federal Council, (parliament) decided to form a 9-member committee under the presidency of Mr Trim Umram Trim, President of the Council to have an urgent meeting with Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, ruler of the UAE to discuss the question of oil price increases. The official UAE news agency said also that the parliament called on the high council of the UAE to examine the internal and external situation of the country. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 23 Feb 80 p. 9]

Oil Product Price Unification--Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, ruler of the UAE last week asked the Ministry of Oil and the National oil companies to take the necessary steps for the unification of gas prices in the emirates. The UAE Council of Ministers had studied the question of increasing gasoline prices in some areas of the country (see previous story) and has decided on measures for the unification of gas prices in the emirates. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 28 Feb 80 p. 9]

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